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Riding a "Friendly Elephant"?
How African Nations Can Make
the Best of Economic Partnership
with China
ABSTRACT

Modern China is a major trading partner with and
investor in Africa. This Note examines its relationships with
Nigeria and South Africa to evaluate whether the benefits they
receive from Chinese involvement, like infrastructure or access
to consumer goods, are outweighed by costs such as worsened
corruption. It next discusses legal measures these countries
have taken to mitigate any costs of Chinese involvement. At
least in Nigeria and South Africa, the concrete benefits of
Chinese trade and investment appear to outweigh the uncertain
costs. However, legal protections adopted to reduce these costs
are likely still inadequate. Given significant barriersto effective
governance, especially in Nigeria, it is in the interests of all
parties to renegotiate their bilateral investment treaties to
promote host government rule of law. This would allow both
African nations to better manage any costs associated with
Chinese activities, while also assuring China of more stable
economic relationships.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In November 2014, China Railway Construction Corporation, a
large state-owned enterprise (SOE) in the People's Republic of China
("the PRC" or "China"), announced a twelve billion dollar plan to
build over 1,400 kilometers of new rail lines. 1 However, the planned
route is not in China at all; rather, it will connect the Nigerian cities
of Lagos and Calabar on either end of that country's coastline. 2 In a
press release, the corporation claimed that its deal with the Nigerian
government would create "up to 200,000 local jobs." 3 This proposed
railway is one example of how China has become Africa's key partner
in economic development in the new millennium. 4 In particular,

1.
Koh Gui Qing & Adam Jourdan, China Railway Construction Wins $12
Billion Nigeria Deal: Xinhua, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2014, 12:39 AM), http:/I
www.reuters.com/article/2014/1 1/20/us-china-railway-construction-nigeria-idUSKCNOJ
40C420141120 [http://perma.cc/J4YA-YFZD] (archived Jan. 23, 2016) (noting that the
company beat out a Mexican competitor in securing the contract).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. (citing the rail corporation's chairman's claim that the construction of
the new line is expected to lead to an additional $4 billion in Chinese exports of goods
like construction machinery, trains and steel products).

4.

See Uch6 U. Ewelukwa, South-South Trade and Investment: The Good, the

Bad, and the Ugly-African Perspectives, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 513, 535-36 (2011)
("Today, China is Africa's largest developing country trade partner, accounting for
about 11% of the continent's external trade, and is Africa's largest source of imports.
UNCTAD suggests that the expansion of trade between China and Africa is the main
driver of the increasing share of developing countries in Africa's trade."); see also

China'sXi Arrives in South Africa for Talks with Zuma, Trade Summit, REUTERS (Dec.
3, 2015), http://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/southern-africa/2015/12/03/chinas.xi-south.
africa-zuma,-trade-summit/ [http://perma.cc/77YY-YLX2] (archived Jan. 23, 2016)
("China is Africa's largest trading partner with trade amounting to $220 billion in
2014, according to Chinese state news agency Xinhua. Its investments in Africa
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investment and trade between China and the nations of sub-Saharan
Africa offer a chance to lift much of the continent's one-billion strong
workforce out of poverty. 5 This Note focuses on two international
economic relationships, between: (i) China and South Africa, and (ii)
China and Nigeria. This Note contributes to scholarship on China's
growing involvement in Africa that, so far, has mainly emphasized
continent-wide generalities and trends.6
No prior works have
attempted to comprehensively analyze the contours of China's
involvement in specific African countries, or to evaluate the costs or
benefits resulting from such involvement.
South Africa and Nigeria serve as viable cases through which to
examine the effects of Chinese investment in and trade with Africa
and how African nations have responded to such involvement. First,
China has extensive economic relations with both countries. South
Africa is the top destination of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) in Africa, followed immediately by Nigeria. 7 South Africa is
also China's largest trading partner on the continent by percentage of
total imports and exports, though several African countries have
8
more significant trading relationships with China than Nigeria.
Both African nations possess large reserves of primary resources that
China requires-various mineral commodities for South Africa, and
petroleum and natural gas in Nigeria. 9 They have dynamic and
amounted to $32.4 billion at the end of 2014, according to London-based BMI
Research.").
5.
See Stephen Haggard, Africa: Unemployable Millions or Global Talent
Pool, IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT, Apr.-May 2013, at 50 (suggesting Africa may be able to
follow China's development model by fostering an educated workforce). The poster child
for the successful developing country, China arguably provides these nations with an
economic model worth emulating. See Ndubisi Obiorah et al., "Peaceful Rise" and
Human Rights: China's Expanding Relations with Nigeria, in CHINA INTO AFRICA:
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 272, 287-89 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2008) ("Many in
African intellectual and political circles are impressed by China's seeming geometric
economic progress since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms in China in the
1980s. This success, often attributed to China's state-led development model, has
rekindled the debate in Africa over appropriate paths to development.").
6.
Though an excellent source, one example of this phenomenon of focusing
primarily on the big picture of the China-Africa relationship is Uche Ewelukwa
Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects-China-Africa Trade: A New Fair Trade
Arrangement, or the Third Scramble for Africa?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (2008)
[hereinafter Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects].
See Margaret Egbula & Qi Zheng, China and Nigeria, A Powerful South7.
South Alliance, WEST AFR. CHALLENGES, Nov. 2011, at 3 (describing the broad strokes
of Nigeria's economic relationship with China); see also U.N. Conference on Trade and
Dev. [UNCTAD], Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), http://unctad.org/enPagesDIAE
Foreign-Direct-Investment-(FDI).aspx [http://perma.cc/6UKT-7DF2] (archived Jan. 22,
2016) (defining FDI as "an investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises
operating outside of the economy of the investor").
8.
See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 7 (providing a chart of China's
trading partners in Africa, ranked by total trading volume and noting that, as of 2010,
Nigeria is ranked fourth).
See SVEN GRIMM ET AL., CENTRE FOR CHINESE STUDIES, SOUTH AFRICAN
9.
RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND TAIWAN: ECONOMIC REALISM AND THE 'ONE-CHINA'
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(especially in Nigeria's case) growing economies, and thus are better
situated than most other sub-Saharan African nations to reap the
benefits of FDI from, and trade with, China. 10 A more utilitarian
reason to select these nations as subjects is that, since Nigeria and
South Africa are among the most prominent African nations, the
literature on their domestic policies and relationship with China
should be more developed. Another is that South Africa and Nigeria
are both democracies. 11 Intuitively, their governments should be
more likely to treat Chinese involvement as an opportunity to
improve the welfare of the electorate-or at least some subset thereof.
In examining the benefits and costs of Chinese involvement from
the perspectives of Nigeria and South Africa, this Note will primarily
explore the costs. The benefits, after all, are largely monetary and
more easily quantifiable. This Note will evaluate the extent to which
these nations' relationships with China have created a net benefit for
them. It will also evaluate how these nations have responded to any
problems caused by China, and explore how to maximize the benefits
of Chinese trade and investment. Part II lays out the parameters of
China's relationship with Africa, and in particular Nigeria and South
Africa. It then presents two competing narratives of China's overall
impact on the African continent. Part III examines the circumstances
in which South Africa and Nigeria have possibly faced negative
consequences from Chinese trade and investment in the form of
human rights abuses due to environmental or labor abuse,
competition or dumping by Chinese firms, and corruption or the
DOCTRINE
18 (2014), http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/O2/ResearchReportFEB-2014_Formatting.pdf [http://perma.cc/LCL9-VG68] (archived Jan. 22,
2016) ("Chinese companies that invest in South Africa thus far have done so mainly in
the mining industry."); Jennifer Reed, Student Submission, South Africa
Revolutionizing Foreign Investment Protection System, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 295,
297 (2014) ("South Africa is a mineral rich nation that is a leading producer and
exporter of gold, as well as coal, chrome, copper, diamonds, iron, manganese, nickel,
silver, and uranium"); cf. Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, The Second Scramble for Africa's
Oil and Mineral Resources: Blessing or Curse?, 42 INT'L LAW. 193, 200 (2008) ('The
variety of crude found in places like Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea is said to be 'light'
and 'sweet.' It is low in sulfur and therefore easier and cheaper to refine than the
Middle Eastern crude, which tends to be lacking in lower hydrocarbons and is very
'sticky."').
10.
See Nigeria:Africa's New Number One, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21600685-nigerias-suddenly-supersized-economy-in
deed-wonder-so-are-its-still-huge
[http://perma.cc/D5DF-U7H7] (archived Jan. 22,
2014) ("[Nigeria's] economy has been growing at an average rate of around 7% a year
over the past decade .... The clearest lesson is for sluggish, complacent South Africa,
which has long taken its status as the continent's giant for granted."). In fact, South
Africa and Nigeria also possess the two largest economies in Africa. See id. (describing
how Nigeria corrected how it measures its GDP, and is now the largest economy on the
continent).
11.
See African Democracy: A Glass Half-Full, ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21551494 [http://perma.cc/BVR5-SBAR] (archived Jan.
22, 2015) (calling South Africa a "flawed democracy," and referring to recent efforts to
prevent voter fraud in Nigeria's 2011 elections).
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degradation of the rule of law. 12 Part TV explores the adequacy of
legal measures South Africa and Nigeria have taken to curtail some
of the problems described in Part III. It touches on the potential for
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to mitigate some these issues, but
notes that at present China's African BITs may be worsening some of
these problems. Part V starts by suggesting that, despite the issues
discussed in Part IV, on balance South Africa and Nigeria have
benefitted from their relationships with China. To the uncertain
extent these countries are harmed by China's actions, however, this
Part proposes that the re-negotiation of their BITs would be in the
best interests of both China and its African partners. BITs are a
more viable method of managing any downsides of Chinese trade and
investment because they subject nations hosting investment ("host
nations") to pressures and concerns beyond that of their domestic
political processes. 13 In future BIT negotiations with China, African
nations such as South Africa and Nigeria should try to increase their
abilities to regulate Chinese investors but should not abandon
beneficial aspects of these BITs, like international arbitration. China
should consider placing additional policy conditions in its African
BITs to improve the rule of law in host countries. By promoting longterm stability in this way, these countries can move their relationship
closer to a true "win-win" ideal.

II. AN

OVERVIEW OF CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA

This Part first describes early developments in the relationship
between the PRC and Africa in general, with a particular focus on
how ideology has shaped China's goals in Africa. It details the
relatively limited contacts that China had with both Nigeria and
South Africa prior to the 1990s. This Part then explores the current
scope of China's relationship with South Africa and Nigeria. It
suggests that China's political and economic liberalization has led it
to seek pragmatic relationships focused more on economic
development. At least in its rhetoric, China often attempts to
differentiate itself from Western nations that are relatively more
willing to intervene in Africa's internal affairs. Finally, this Part
introduces the reader to two contrasting narratives of China's

12.
There are many definitions of the rule of law. In this Note, it will suffice to
say the rule of law requires that the law is (1) publicly known and binding; (2) accepted
and respected by the population; and (3) fairly enforced, such as by the courts. See John
Mukum Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth Creation and Development in
Africa: The Role of the Rule of Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 959, 988-90 (2013) (drawing
definitions from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, various scholars and jurists, and
the American Bar Association).
13.
See infra Part V.
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involvement in Africa, and provides some evidence of its positive
impacts.

A. Relations Priorto the New Millennium
Formal relations between post-colonial African countries and the
PRC began around 1955, after the first Asia-Africa Conference was
Six
held in Bandung, Indonesia (the "Bandung Conference"). 1 4
African nations participated. 15 China and the growing number of
newly independent African nations saw one another as sharing a
common history of exploitation by Western powers. 16 The Bandung
Conference helped establish the Non-Aligned Movement, which
sought to "unite the developing countries in such a way that they
adopted a neutral position in the Cold War between the then two
superpowers." 17 A "Final Communiqu6," drafted at the Bandung
Conference, also set forth lofty principles that were meant to govern
18
future Chinese engagement in Africa.
In line with the tone at Bandung, China's first few decades of
interactions with Africa were driven more by ideological concerns
Principally, China wanted to stave off
than economic ones. 19
diplomatic isolation; it sought new allies after falling out with the
Soviet Union. 2 0 To that end, it supported socialist governments like
that of Tanzania financially, and indirectly aided left-leaning guerilla
groups, including some in South Africa. 21 China also negotiated

See Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 512 (noting
14.
that a trade agreement with Egypt was also signed shortly after the conference).
15.
Id. at 513 n.28 (referring to "Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (now Ghana),
Liberia, Libya, and the Sudan.").
See id. at 512-14 (determining the major objective of Bandung I to be "to
16.
promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism or
neocolonialism by the United States, the Soviet Union, or any other imperialistic
nation").
17.
Okeke, supra note 9, at 198.
See Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 513-14 n.34
18.
(describing the Bandung Declaration of 10 Principles as including, among other things,
respect for human rights and national sovereignty, racial equality, and nonaggression).
See id. at 514 (emphasizing the parties' "common desire to overcome the
19.
legacies of colonialism and forge closer ties with one another.").
See Timothy Webster, China's Human Rights Footprint in Africa, 51
20.
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 626, 644 (2013) (asserting that China turned to Africa in
response to opposition from the United States and, after the Sino-Soviet split, the
USSR as well).
21.
See Joshua Eisenman, China's Political Outreach to Africa, in CHINA INTO
AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 230, 231 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009) (suggesting
China's influence with African guerillas is perhaps overplayed, but noting that they
provided moral and rhetorical support as well as "modest arms shipments"); Jeremy

Kelley, China in Africa: Curing the Resource Curse with Infrastructure and
Modernization, 12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POLY 35, 37 n.71 (2012) (tying Chinese
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several trade agreements and aid packages with various African
nations and funded projects such as the "Tan-Zam railway" between
Tanzania and Zambia. 2 2 This was a major public relations coup
because it provided landlocked Zambia a connection to the Indian
Ocean, and because the United States and United Kingdom
previously declined to fund the project. 23 Chinese development aid
during this period coalesced into the form that it maintains today,
focusing on the "five pillars" of agriculture, light industry, utilities,
infrastructure, medical support, and technical training. 2 4 In return,
African allies became "instrumental to China's success" in taking
Taiwan's place at the United Nations in 1971.25
Nigeria and China formally established diplomatic relations the
same year that China gained UN recognition. 2 6 Though there were
earlier attempts to bolster economic ties between the two nations,
such as the establishment of a Nigerian-Chinese Chamber of
Commerce in 1994, it was only after the democratic election of
Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 ended decades of military rule in Nigeria
27
that trade between the two "began to develop in earnest.
President Obasanjo initiated a series of "oil-for-infrastructure" deals
whereby Nigeria awarded favorable oil contracts to China in
exchange for funding for various infrastructure projects. 28 By 2001,
29
trade between the countries had reached 1.14 billion dollars.
By contrast, until the 1990s relations between South Africa and
China were unfriendly. South Africa had not been invited to the
Bandung conference, in part due to its Apartheid policies. 3 0 Another
significant ideological rift was that South Africa refused to adhere to
the "One China" policy-the PRC's claim that it is the sole legitimate

investments in Africa during this period specifically to opposition to the existing world
order).
Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supranote 6, at 515.
22.
23.
See Webster, supra note 20, at 646 (referring to a report that found China
"'had become the African countries' favorite donor in the early 1970s,' by funding a
wide assortment of infrastructure projects"). The Tan-Zam railway cost $500 million in
30-year interest-free loans, and required 50,000 Chinese laborers to complete. See
Kelley, supra note 21, at 37 (calling the Tan-Zam railway "one of the most costly
infrastructure investments China has ever made in Africa.").
24.
Webster, supra note 20, at 645.
Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 515-16.
25.
Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 4.
26.
27.
Id.
Id. at 5.
28.
29.
See Obiorah et al., supra note 5, at 274 (asserting that the new millennium
saw significantly expanded trade between Nigeria and China).
30.
See Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 513 (noting
that Taiwan, Israel, and the Koreas were also excluded from Bandung); Bandung Int'l
Conference, Final Communiqud of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung, at 6 (Apr.
23, 1955), http://franke.uchicago.edu/FinalCommunique-Bandung-1955.pff [https://
perma.cc/73DJ-RAWV] (archived Feb. 8, 2016) (condemning South African apartheid
specifically).
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31
government of China and that Taiwan is inseparable from China.
Following the United Nation's 1971 acceptance of the PRC as the
legitimate government of China, Taiwan and South Africa were both
increasingly seen as international pariahs, and consequently
developed closer ties with one another. 32 However, by 1996 South
Africa relented. It transferred diplomatic recognition to the PRC in
recognition of China's increased liberalization and international
33
acceptance, as well as South Africa's own abolition of Apartheid.
Nevertheless, by that time South Africa already had 1.3 billion
34
dollars worth of trade with China.

B. Modern Developments in China-South Africa and China-

Nigeria Relations
Anti-colonialism and socialism are no longer the touchstones of

China's foreign relations policy in Africa. 35

While that country's

leaders have continued to criticize western "hegemonism" and
"imperialism," 3 6 their priorities have evidently shifted toward

31.

South Africa and Taiwan Sever Relations, BBC (Jan. 1, 1998),

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/43856.stm [http://perma.cc/CGJ7-3S8Z] (archived Jan. 22,
2016) (noting that the loss of South Africa's support cost Taiwan its last major
supporter as the legitimate government of all of China). China's aforementioned aid to
anti-government rebels and its ties with the South African Communist Party are a few
forms that this hostility took. See Eisenman, supra note 21, at 231, 237, 240
(discussing training sessions that the Chinese Communist Party holds for "long
standing" Party allies); Kelley, supra note 21, at 37 n.71 (explaining that the Tan-Zam
railway was intended to "enable Zambia to be used as a base for guerillas fighting
white regimes in Eastern and South Africa").
See GRIMM ET AL., supra note 9, at 24 ('The political catalyst which
32.
inevitably pressed South Africa and Taiwan into a more robust economic relationship
with each other was that both faced growing isolation by the international
community.").
33.
See id. at 25 ("In the 1990s, when it became evident that South Africa was
on the path to democratisation and regime change, the South Africa-Taiwanese
relationship increasingly came under strain."); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Taiwan,

Snubbed by South Africa, Ends Aid and Recalls Envoy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/06/world/taiwan-snubbed-by-south-africa-ends-aid(archived Jan. 22, 2016)
[http://perma.cc/JUY2-K8ZS]
and-recalls-envoy.html
(describing the political fallout of South Africa's transferring of recognition from
Taiwan to China).
See McNeil, supra note 33 (showing that this actually exceeded trade with
34.
Taiwan by 1996).
35.
See Li Anshan, China's New Policy Toward Africa, in CHINA INTO AFRICA:
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 21, 22-25 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009) (providing a brief
overview of the influence of socialist ideology on China's foreign policy).
36.
See Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 535 (quoting a
statement by former General Secretary Hu Yaobang in the 1980s); see also Leslie Hook
& Katrina Manson, China Pledges More Investments to Africa, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 25,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/a2bc930e-9517 1le2-a4fa-OO144feabdcO.html#slideO
2013),
[http://perma.cc/6DVS-V4T3] (archived Jan. 22, 2016) ("Chinese diplomats routinely
contrast China's approach [to Africa] with that of Western countries whose armies and
aid are entangled across the continent.").
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economic and diplomatic concerns. 3 7 This change occurred as China
began to gradually introduce market reforms and liberalized
politically around 1978, following the end of the Cultural
The Asia-Africa Summit of 2005, to which the
Revolution. 38
Presidents of Nigeria and South Africa were invited, "sought to
reinvigorate the spirit of Bandung." 3 9 Heralding this shift, however,
a "Declaration on the Asian-African New Strategic Partnership"
signed there emphasized "the need to promote practical cooperation
between the two continents in [many industries]" rather than
40
political solidarity within the developing world.
Despite recent events, the Chinese economy in the twenty-first
41
It
century remains an engine of sustained and remarkable growth.

See Wenran Jiang, China's Emerging Strategic Partnerships in Africa, in
37.
CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 50, 51 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009)
("China's economic reforms have gradually moved China away from its radical
revolutionary worldview."); see also Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note
6, at 532 (asserting that mutual need still drives the China-Africa relationship, but
conceding that Chinese involvement should not be assigned a single motive).
38.
See Martyn J. Davies, Special Economic Zones: China's Developmental
Model Comes to Africa, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 137, 138
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009) (describing the creation of the SEZs in the late 1970s). In
the mid-1980s, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang announced "four principles" of SouthSouth cooperation: "equality and mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversity
in form, and common progress." Deborah Brautigam, China's Foreign Aid in Africa:
What Do We Know?, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 197, 203-04
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009). Deng Xiaoping initiated these reforms in the 1980s; they
continued despite the Tiananmen Square incident, accelerated under the leadership of
Hu Jintao from 2002 to 2012, and continue under current Party Chairman Xi Jinping.
See, e.g., Phoenix X.F. Cai, Trading with Foreigners:An InterdisciplinaryAnalysis of
China's Core Interests in Trade and Foreign Policy, 47 AKRON L. REV. 809, 815 (2014)
("Hu Jintao presided over China's phenomenal rise as a global economic power in just
ten years."); Mark Magnier & Jeremy Page, Xi Jinping: China's Economic Risks 'Not
That Scary, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/xi-jinping-chinaseconomic-risks-not-that-scary-1415516936 [http:lperma.cc/8YFV.C6ZA] (archived Jan
22, 2016) (reporting comments by Xi Jinping regarding improving China's social safety
net, further opening capital markets, and shifting to a consumer economy). From these
reforms has emerged an overall policy called "socialism with Chinese characteristics,"
or "market socialism," whereby the Chinese state has attempted to speed along
economic growth through privatization, while avoiding the so-called economic and
political "hurly-burly" of a totally free-market system. See Lan Cao, The Cat That
Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 97, 110 (1995).
See Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 520-21.
39.
Leaders from India, Indonesia, and Trinidad and Tobago also attended. See id. (listing
the attending heads of state).
See id. Following this, a 2006 China-Africa Summit in Beijing fostered
40.
high-level talks between political and business leaders from many African countries.
See Okeke, supra note 9, at 198-99 ("In terms of propaganda effect, there is no doubt
that the summit catapulted China to greater fame in world affairs.").
Ben Carter, Is China's Economy Really the Largest in the World?, BBC
41.
(Dec 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30483762 [http://perma.cc/J9MYFKFZ] (archived Jan. 23, 2016) (referring, albeit skeptically, to recent IMF findings
that China's purchasing-power-parity-adjusted Gross Domestic Product now exceeds
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maintains centrally-planned aspects, the most relevant of which here
are its transnational SOEs. 4 2 As a result, much of China's trade and
investment activities are led by the state. 4 3 Perhaps surprisingly, the
Chinese government has often vocally rejected opportunities to
influence foreign domestic affairs. 4 4 China instead holds itself out as
having a laissez-faire approach to its trading partners. 4 5 As will be
discussed later in this Note, this approach is not necessarily mutually
beneficial. China's high rate of economic growth depends on stable
access to raw materials. 46 An efficient means to acquire such
materials is through trade, and indeed the majority of China's
imports from Africa are oil and other raw materials. 47 This is one

that of the United States, with a growth rate of around 7 percent). But see, e.g., Keith

Bradsher, Chinese Data Mask Depth of Slowdown, Executives Say, N.Y. TIMES (June
22, 2012), http:// www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/business/global/chinese-data-said-to-bemanipulated-understating-its-slowdown.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
[http://perma.cc/C3GN-VXNP] (archived Jan. 23, 2016) ("[Chinese] [o]fficials at all
levels of government are under pressure to report good economic results to Beijing as
they wait for promotions, demotions and transfers to cascade down from Beijing. So
narrower and seemingly more obscure measures of economic activity are being
falsified, according to the executives and economists.").

42.
See Lucas C. Jenson, Note, The Restrictive Theory of Foreign Sovereign
Immunity and the Chinese-African Economic Relationship, 22 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 563, 567-69 (2013) (explaining that modern SOEs are usually
owned, but not managed, by the state).
See, e.g., Patrick Munson & Zheng Ronghui, Feeding the Dragon:
43.

Managing Chinese Resource Acquisition in Africa, 2 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 343, 361
(2012) ("SOEs carry out the vast majority of resource acquisition [outward FDI] from
China into Africa."). This would suggest that responsibility for these SOEs actions
should ultimately rest with the Chinese government itself, rather than private
individuals.

44.

See Elise Aiken, Note, Energy Justice: Achieving Stability in Oil-Producing

African Nations, 22 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 101, 111 (2011) ("At the same
time, China 'fiercely repudiates the increasingly powerful notion that outside
interference into the domestic affairs of a state can be legitimate,' and, therefore, is
willing to deal with corrupt African governments.").
45.
See Won Kidane, Reflections on China-AfricaBITs, 107 AM. SOC'y INT'L L.
PROC. 225, 226 n.3 (2013) (citing a 2010 UNCTAD report contrast China with the
approach taken by Africa's traditional western trading partners).
46.
Africa and China: More Than Minerals, ECONOMIST (Mar. 23, 2013)
[hereinafter More Than Minerals], http://www.economist.comlnews/middle-east-andafricaI2 1574012-chinese-trade-africa-keeps-growing-fears-neocolonialism-are-overdonemore [http://perma.cc/AFP6-RWLP] (archived Jan. 23, 2016) (noting that China is now
the top consumer of oil in the world). As of 2009, China has surpassed the United
States as Africa's largest trading partner. See id. (noting that, as of 2012, China's trade
with Africa was nearly $200 billion, approximately double the American trade with the
continent).

47.

See Mingwei Ma, 8 Facts About China's Investments in Africa, BROOKINGS

Now BLOG (May 20, 2014), http://www.brookings.edufblogs/brookings-now/posts/2014/
[http://perma.cc/2QFM-QBGE] (archived
05/8-facts-about-china-investment-in-africa
Jan. 23, 2016) (citing statistics from a recent John L. Thornton China Center/Africa
Growth Initiative paper showing that, as of 2011, 80 percent of China's $93 billion in
imports from Africa were "crude oil, raw materials and resources').
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major reason why China has such substantial trading and investment
48
relations with Nigeria and South Africa.
As of 2010, around 87 percent of China's imports from Nigeria
were petroleum or natural gas products, while Nigeria imports a
variety of manufactured goods from the PRC. 49 The two countries
have signed a series of trade agreements since 2001, including a BIT
that year. 50 China has also invested heavily, though not exclusively,
in Nigeria's oil industry. 5 1 Based on 2012 data, there are sixty-seven
ongoing Chinese investment projects in Nigeria. 52 In all, the Chinese
government operates over thirty companies or joint ventures with
Its state-owned oil companies, like Petrochina
Nigeria. 53
International and China National Offshore Oil Corporation
deals with their Nigerian
have signed major
(CNOOC),
counterparts. 5 4 One set of deals in 2005-2006, involving both crude
oil sales and drilling rights, was worth approximately 7 billion
dollars. 55 In 2010, the two countries signed a deal worth 23 billion
dollars to jointly finance construction of additional refineries in
Nigeria, 56 and in 2014 another Chinese firm agreed to provide 10

See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 4, 7, 9 (providing UN data on
48.
Chinese trade and investment in Africa; other major partners are Angola and Sudan).
Id. at 8.
49.
Id. at 4 (listing ten "major agreements" from 2001 to 2010). This followed
50.
on the heels of Nigeria's failure to ratify a more restricted BIT in 1997. See Amos
Irwin, Crossing the Ocean by Feelingfor the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China's
Bilateral Investment Treaties, at 10 n.30 (Global Econ. Governance Initiative, Paper
No. 3, 2014) (noting that, ironically, the 1997 deal was probably more favorable to
Nigeria).
See id. at 9 ("Chinese FDI stocks in Nigeria totaled USD 1.03 billion in the
51.
period [of 2003 to 2009] .... Chinese investments are concentrated in the oil industry,
manufacturing, construction and telecoms."). Nigerian investments in China are far
more limited. See id. (discussing how several Nigerian banks have opened branches in
China).
But see Miria Pigato & Wenxia Tang, China and Africa: Expanding
52.
Economic Ties in an Evolving Global Context 14, (World Bank, Working Paper No.
95161, 2015) (noting that China's projects in Nigeria only account for 2.21 percent of
projects in sub-Saharan Africa that year).
See S.N. YADAV, CHINA-AFRICA STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT 103 (2010)
53.
(describing projects spearheaded by Chinese firms to expand railways and built sports
stadiums, among other things).
See Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 527-28
54.
(discussing the role of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the CNOOC in expanding that
country's access to African oil sources).
See id. at 528 (describing the most recent deals between Nigeria and China
55.
at the time the article was written).
Nigeria and China Sign $23bn Deal for Three Refineries, BBC (May 14,
56.
2010), http://www.bbc.com/news/10116945 [http://perma.cc/27H6-7P4R] (archived Jan.
23, 2016) ('The two [state-run oil firms] will jointly seek financing and credits from
Chinese authorities and banks to build three refineries and a fuel complex in
Nigeria.").
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billion dollars for offshore oil exploration projects. 57 China has also
financed the construction of two special economic zones (SEZs) in
Nigeria. 58 These zones are not only meant to garner goodwill for
China by developing local infrastructure for specialized purposes, but
also shorten supply lines and allow Chinese businesses to benefit
from domestic treatment. 5 9 On the other hand, President Umaru
Yar'Adua cancelled these "oil-for-infrastructure" deals in 2007.60
China's trade with South Africa is also extensive, accounting for
over 22 percent of its total trade with Africa, 6 1 approximately 25
billion dollars as of 2010.62 South Africa mainly exports various raw
"industrial bulk
materials-such
as coal, iron, or other
64
imports manufactured goods from China.
commodities" 63-and
Beyond the size of South Africa's market and relative wealth, its
political stability as compared to many of its neighbors makes it a
The countries have
more attractive investment destination. 65

57.
See Nigeria: Chinese Firm Invests U.S. $10 Billion in Bida Basin, ALL
AFRICA (Jan. 8, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201401080277.html?aasource=
slideout [http://perma.cc/LGV4-UF4K] (archived Jan. 23, 2016) ("[A] Chinese firm has
agreed to invest over $10 billion in the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas in
Bida Basin.").
58.
See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 14-16 (describing SEZs in Ogun
state and the Lekki peninsula near Lagos).
See id. at 15-16 (asserting that China established these and other zones
59.
abroad to "showcase the effectiveness of its development model and to share its
experience with friendly nations.").
60.
See id. at 5, 9 (citing concerns over a lack of transparency in cancelling
these deals). Possibly this change in policy was in fact due to pressure from Western
companies or the government's desire to seek out more lucrative deals. See Emeka
Umejei, Nigeria: Why Did China's Infrastructurefor Resources Deal Fail in Nigeria?,
AFR. ARGUMENTS (Sept. 2, 2013), http://africanarguments.org/2013/09/02/why-did[https://perma
chinas-infrastructure-for-resources-deal-fail-in-nigeria-by-emeka-umejei
.cc/HHN8-4BBC] (archived Feb. 8, 2016).
Cf. Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 7 (noting that Angola, China's second
61.
largest trading partner, accounts for 17.5 percent of total African trade).

62.

See

China Becomes

South Africa's

Biggest

Export Destination:

Ambassador, XINHUA (Aug. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Biggest Export], http://en.people.cn/
90883/7575556.html [http://perma.cc/7YR5-PD4L] (archived Jan. 23, 2016) (referencing
Chinese customs statistics). But see GRIMM ET AL., supra note 9, at 18 (estimating the
volume of trade much more conservatively, at $11 billion as of 2011).
63.
Dewald van Rensburg, Sun Sets on SA's Coal Exports to China, CITY PRESS
(Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Sun-sets.on-SAs-coalexports-to-China-20150429 [http://perma.cc/S2Y4-YVXP] (archived Jan. 23, 2016)
(noting that otherwise high coal sales to China unexpectedly dropped in 2014 due to
fluctuations in the commodities markets).
See GRIMM ET AL., supranote 9, at 19 (suggesting South Africa may be able
64.
to begin exporting manufactured or "semi-finished" goods soon, due to Chinese
investment in the production sector).
65.
See id. at 18 ("South Africa is arguably also seen as a springboard and
convenient base from which China can expand its influence to other countries in the
region; this is particularly the case for industries which require sound and reliable
governance structures, such as financial services, for instance.").
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maintained a BIT since 1997.66 Investment between the countries in
2010 exceeded 7 billion dollars. 67 In 2011 alone, the Development
Bank of South Africa and the China Development Bank agreed to
invest 2.5 billion dollars in South African development projects. 68 By
2013, around one hundred Chinese SOEs were operating within
South Africa. 69
Unlike Nigeria, South Africa and South African
70
corporations also invest significantly in China.
C. China's Influence in Africa: Benign or Malign?
Beyond the bare statistics, whether China's involvement is a net

positive for these countries remains controversial.

71

On one hand,

China's involvement in Africa may be viewed as an exercise of "neocolonial" power.
Some authors have even described this as the

"dominant narrative of China in Africa. 72 In this narrative, China is
siphoning off Africa's natural resources to support its own growth
without providing equivalent benefits to its African partners, and is

supporting despotic regimes, feeding conflicts, and "degrading the
people, land and water of Africa through predatory labor practices,
environmental
destruction
and
scholars contend that China's

violent
suppressions." 7 3
Some
apparent commitment to non-

interference and state sovereignty is merely a "guise" to "legitimize
human rights abuses and undemocratic practices" in the countries in

66.
See LUKE E. PETERSON, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, SOUTH AFRICA'S
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 7 (2006), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global]04137-20080708.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P6W3-8P9C (archived Feb. 27, 2016) (listing all of South Africa's BITs).
67.
See Biggest Export, supra note 62 (citing a statement by South African
ambassador Bheki Langa).
68.
See GRIMM ET AL., supra note 9, at 16 (referencing "mining, infrastructure,
transport, communication, energy, and agricultural projects.").
69.
Jacob Zuma, President, S. Mr. Address by President Zuma During the
China-South Africa Business Forum Meeting, on the Occasion of the State Visit to the
People's Republic of China, Beijing (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Zuma Address], http://
www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2014/jzuml2O5.html
[perma.cc/XJ7W-FZX3] (archived
Jan. 26, 2016) (discussing plans for expanding South Africa-China relations in 2015).
70.
See Harry G. Broadman, Chinese-African Trade and Investment: The
Vanguard of South-South Commerce in the Twenty-First Century, in CHINA INTO
AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 87, 106 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009) (noting
South African FDI in China surpassed $100 million as of 2004).
71.
See generally Webster, supra note 20 (controverting the "copious
commentary from the West, much of it negative" on China's engagements in Africa).
72.
See id. at 627 (noting this view has been adopted by various
"[i]nternational media, think tanks, NGOs, bloggers, academics, government officials
(elected and appointed), [and] international financial institutions"); Wikileaks: US
Monitors 'Aggressive' China in Africa, BBC (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-11955516 [perma.cc/XK9V-GV9E] (archived Jan. 26, 2016) (quoting
a U.S. diplomat in Nigeria who described China as "a very aggressive and pernicious
economic competitor with no morals").
73.
Webster, supra note 20, at 628.

512

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:499

which it invests. 74 Accusations of exploitation have come from
Western as well as African officials-notably in Zambia and
75
Nigeria.
On the other hand, China may in fact be a benevolent partner
and attractive alternative to continued dependence on the West.
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese government espouses this view, calling
itself "a friendly elephant. ' 76 In a 2014 visit to Ethiopia, Nigeria,
Angola, and Kenya, Premier Li Keqiang emphasized his country's
desire to improve standards of living on the continent and to partner
with African nations in areas such as agriculture, manufacturing,
and infrastructure-not just oil and minerals. 7 7 Li described recent
disputes, such as those surrounding strikes at Chinese-funded
petroleum facilities in Chad and Niger, as merely "growing pains" in
China's outward stance toward
the Sino-African relationship.7 8
Africa is part of a larger narrative of its "peaceful rise," which it has
promoted since the 1990s. 79 Unlike nineteenth century imperial
powers, China asserts that its involvement in Africa follows "a path

74.

Robert I. Rotberg, China's Quest for Resources, Opportunities, and

Influence in Africa, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 1, 15 (Robert I.
Rotberg ed., 2009).

75.

See, e.g., Barry Sautman, The Chinese Defilement Case: Racial Profilingin

an African "Model of Democracy", 14 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 87, 93-95 (2013)
(describing the anti-Chinese rhetoric of Michael Sata, President of Zambia from 2011 to

2014); David Smith, Hillary Clinton Launches African Tour with Veiled Attack on
China, GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2012) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/O1/
26, 2016)
Jan.
(archived
[perma.cc/5J99-WK8D]
hillary-clinton-africa-china
(interpreting then-Secretary of State Clinton's remark that "America will stand up for
democracy and universal human rights even when it might be easier to look the other
way and keep the resources flowing" as referring to China). In another recent example
in Nigeria, a central bank governor reportedly "excoriated the Chinese for exuding 'a
whiff of colonialism."' More than Minerals, supra note 46. According to that former
central bank governor, "[i]n much of Africa, [the Chinese] have set up huge mining
operations. They have also built infrastructure. But, with exceptions, they have done so
using equipment and labor imported from home, without transferring skills to local
communities. So China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This
was also the essence of colonialism." WENJIE CHEN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., WHY IS
CHINA INVESTING IN AFRICA? EVIDENCE FROM THE FIRM LEVEL 2 (2015),
www.brookings.edu/-/media/researchlfiles/papers/2015/08/why-china-is-investing-inafricalwhy-is-china-investing-in-africa.pdf [perma.cc/T9CK-QZGB] (archived Jan. 26,
2016).
Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 995
76.
(2011).

77.

See Ben Blanchard, China Says Premier's Africa Visit About More Than

Just Oil Deals, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2014 6:53 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
[perma.cc/2KWJ-K4XK]
article/2014/04/30/us-china-africa-idUSBREA3TOB520140430
(archived Jan. 26, 2016) (asserting that "China is also keen not to be perceived as an
imperial master.").

78.

David Stanway, China Premier Says Sino-Africa Disputes Just "Growing

Pains",REUTERS (May 4, 2014, 1:29 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/04/us.
china-africa-idUSBREA4300L20140504 [perma.cc/5WGC-Q3YA] (archived Jan. 25,
2016).
Yu, supra note 76, at 993-94.
79.
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based not on aggressive changes to the international order, but
instead on benevolent principles of mutual benefit." 80
Whichever side is correct overall, one must concede that China
has provided some concrete forms of assistance to its African
China has improved
partners, both directly and incidentally.
standards of living in Africa by providing infrastructure, jobs, and
consumer goods. 8 1 In Nigeria specifically, Chinese-funded roads,
airports, railways, and power plants may rectify "one of the major
impediments" to the modernization of the Nigerian economy. 8 2 Along
the way tens of thousands of Nigerians have received technical
training in China, and the two nations have engaged in several high
profile technology transfers. 83 Trade with China has improved access
to consumer goods in Nigeria, particularly telecommunications
equipment like cell phones. 84 At least one study concluded "[tihere is
no question that low prices for imported Chinese goods have
benefitted African consumers, as well as producers who rely on
imported inputs and capital goods." 8 5 Chinese companies directly
employ Nigerians in the oil industry, as well as in agriculture and the
manufacture of products like plastics, ceramics, leather, building
materials, pharmaceuticals, or food and beverages. 86 All of this helps
to alleviate Nigeria's unemployment rate, which was at least 19.7
percent as of 2011.87
Less has been written about the benefits of Chinese trade and
investment in South Africa. This is perhaps because, compared to
Nigeria, South Africa does not have as far to climb in its

80.
Id.
See, e.g., Webster, supra note 20, at 649-62 (discussing how Chinese
81.
involvement in Africa has actually helped bolster socioeconomic rights to food, water,
medicine, education, and infrastructure).
82.
See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 14 ("China Civil Engineering
Construction Corporation (CCECC ), the biggest Chinese construction company in
Nigeria, currently has more than 50 projects underway and has invested more than
USD 10 billion in the country.").

83.

See David Haroz, China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation?, 35

FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 65, 75 (2011) ("Between 2000 and 2006, 16,000 African
professionals were trained in China, and another 15,000 received training from 2007 to
2009. At the 2009 FOCAC, China pledged to train 20,000 more African professionals in
various sectors from 2010 to 2012. As one Nigerian official noted, 'The Western world is
never prepared to transfer technology-but the Chinese do, [and] while China's
technology may not be as sophisticated as some Western governments', it is better to
have Chinese technology than to have none at all.").
See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 12-13 (reporting that phones
84.
manufactured by Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE are between 5 percent and 40
percent cheaper than those made by European or American companies).
85.
Pigato & Tang, supra note 52, at 7-8.
86.
But see id. at 11, 14 (noting that most positions with Chinese companies
are low-skill jobs).
See id. at 18 (referring to other scholars who believe this number is "a
87.
gross underestimation").
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development. Its per capita income is significantly higher than
88
China's, and is among the most developed nations on the continent.
Nonetheless, South Africa has also received quantifiable economic
benefits from Chinese trade and investment. 8 9 The South African
government certainly appears to believe it is benefiting from this
relationship.
In a speech in late 2014, President Jacob Zuma
announced plans to "advance [South Africa's] economic partnership"
with China significantly in 2015.90 While for the first half of 2015,
Chinese investment in Africa actually flagged by more than 40
percent, in December of that year the PRC agreed to invest 6.5 billion
dollars in South Africa, and the SeE Beijing Automotive Group
announced plans to invest 11 billion to construct a major auto plant
in the country. 9 1 One other particularly interesting area of Chinese
investment in South Africa is the renewable energy sector. 92 Recent
joint ventures with Chinese utilities and manufacturers have helped
South Africa, which produces by far the most greenhouse gasses on
the continent, to transition to cleaner technologies by building six
93
wind farms and setting up a wind turbine manufacturing plant.
Continued access to Chinese capital and new jobs remains important
94
in South Africa, which faces a 25 percent unemployment rate.
China also grants aid packages like those previously described to both
95
countries, along with concessional and commercial loans.
Concessional loans are low-interest loans made by the Chinese

88.
See Brautigam, supra note 38, at 200 (citing Mauritius, Botswana, and
South Africa as examples of nations that have higher per capita income than China,
yet still receive aid from it).

89.

See supra Part II.C.

90.
Zuma Address, supra note 69.
91.
See Franz Wild & Amogelang Mbatha, China's Xi Pledges $6.5 Billion to
Support S. Africa Economy, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2015- 12-02/xi-s-south-africa-visit-starts-with-6-5.bilion-in-agre
ements [perma.cc/CPX3-TYRG] (archived Jan. 27, 2016) (describing how the
investment would go to various energy and railway projects, as well as extend a 2.5
billion dollar line of credit to South Africa).

92.

See Ruth Gordon, The Environmental Implications of China's Engagement

with Sub-Saharan Africa, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11109, 11122 (2012)
(referring to Chinese-owned wind and solar plants in South Africa).
93.
Id. at 11122, 11123 n.184.

94.

See Ann Bernstein, South Africa's Key Challenges: Tough Choices and New

Directions, 652 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 20, 25 (2014) (blaming this problem
on persistent slow job growth and lack of educational opportunities).

95.
See, e.g., Deborah Brautigam, Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What,
Where, Why, and How Much?, in RISING CHINA: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 203, 206-07 (Jane Golley & Ligang Song eds., 2011) ("According to [a]
2010 interview [with a China Development Bank official], the largest proportion of the
[commercial] loans issued so far has gone to South Africa, Angola and Botswana.");
Obiorah et al., supra note 5, at 276 (discussing one $2.5 billion loan to Nigeria by
China's Eximbank in 2006, of which $500 million was concessional).
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government to developing countries. 96 They are used to fund
97
development projects, but are subject to very few conditions.
This Note, at least in part, examines which of these two
narratives is more accurate-that of "neo-colonial" exploitation, or of
mutual benefit. Though both are simplistic, they possess elements of
truth and serve as useful framing devices. The truth, most likely, is
Perhaps the first
somewhere in between the two extremes. 98
narrative is relatively true for some African nations, the second more
so for other nations. In any case, following on the heels of this
question is another: What should African nations do about China?

III.

DOWNSIDES TO CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH
AFRICA

This Part examines the accuracy
in South Africa and Nigeria. 99 There
on this topic, perhaps because China's
very transparent. 100 As a result,

of the "neo-colonial" narrative
is a shortage of scholarly work
dealings in Africa are often not
this Note's discussion of any

But see Paul Hubbard, Chinese ConcessionalLoans, in CHINA INTO AFRICA:
96.
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 217, 217-27 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009) (noting,
however, that the nature of these loans and where precisely they go suffer from a lack
of transparency).
See id. at 218 ('Multilateral banks are 'losing projects in Asia and Africa to
97.
Chinese because [the Chinese] don't bother about social or human rights conditions."').
Both sides have strong motives to "spin" a narrative. Cf. Stephanie Rupp,
98.
Africa and China: Engaging Postcolonial Interdependencies, in CHINA INTO AFRICA:
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 65, 67 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009) ("China expands its
interests in Africa at the expense of the United States and the EU, eliciting reactions
in Washington and in European capitals that reflect this potential displacement.").
Cf. Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of
99.
Unconditioned Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 84, 112 (2009) (positing that
unconditional aid to countries like Nigeria encourage rent-seeking behavior by local
officials); Munson & Zheng, supra note 43, at 349-50.
See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 96, at 218 ("In interviews, Chinese officials
100.
have been either unwilling or unable to provide details of loans. Scholars and
policymakers are left to speculate on the details of Chinese aid."). This is probably not
a deliberate obfuscation tactic as much as it is a failure to make such materials
accessible to non-Chinese readers, however. See id. at 226 (conceding that even the
published information is far from comprehensive). Nevertheless, the lack of any
"systematic sharing of data" between Chinese and international lenders has stoked
Western fears that "Chinese lending practices may encourage the rapid recurrence of
unsustainable debt in Africa." Chin-Hao Huang, China's Renewed Partnerships with
Africa: Implications for the United States, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND
INFLUENCE 296, 303 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009). Likewise, there are significant
barriers to accessing public records or economic data in nations like Nigeria. Cf.
NIGERIA,
COUNTRY/TERRITORY:
BY
CORRUPTION
INT'L,
TRANSPARENCY
[perma.cc/Q947-HJKQ]
http://www.transparency.org/country#NGADataResearch
(archived on Jan. 27, 2016) (listing Nigeria's budget openness as of 2010 as "scant or
none"). Some speculation and reliance on non-scholarly sources are therefore
unavoidable.
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negative externalities imposed by China will be incomplete; it is very
difficult to link specific Chinese policies to specific injuries to its trade
Nonetheless, this Part proposes that there are some
partners.
circumstances where Chinese involvement probably harms the
interests of South Africa and Nigeria. 10 1 First, this Part attempts to
determine whether Chinese companies in particular are (i)
contributing to environmental degradation in Nigeria, or (ii)
Next, it discusses the
mistreating workers in both countries.
macroeconomic fallout from the dumping of Chinese goods and the
This is a more
out-competing of domestic labor and firms.
complicated issue, as Chinese imports can have both negative and
positive effects. Finally, this Part covers the nature of corruption in
South Africa and Nigeria, and whether it is tied to China. As Chinese
investment and aid is often unconditional or unmonitored, there is
perhaps good reason to believe it fosters corruption and worsens the
"resource curse" in both Nigeria and South Africa, even absent direct
evidence that Chinese firms engage in bribery or other corrupt
practices.
A. PotentialHuman Rights Violations
1. Environmental Damage in Nigeria
Much of Nigeria's oil wealth is situated around the deltas of the
Niger River and offshore in the neighboring Gulf of Guinea. 10 2 The
nation has serious problems with pollution and environmental
degradation, largely because of development in the oil and gas

101.
It is worth noting that this section does not discuss one area where China
has received extremely harsh international criticism: providing aid to despotic regimes
while turning a blind eye to how it is used. These concerns, however, are not at play in
South Africa and Nigeria. See, e.g., Webster, supra note 20, at 641 (arguing China's
failure to concern itself with the domestic politics of its trading partners has resulted in
its aid propping up strongmen like Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Omar al-Bashir in
Sudan, Moussa Didis Camara of Guinea, and Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola).
Especially notorious has been China's longstanding sales of arms and military
equipment to Sudan, which may have been used in the Darfur genocide. See Stephanie

L. Kotecki, The Human Rights Costs of China'sArms Sales to Sudan-A Violation of
InternationalLaw on Two Fronts, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 209, 232 (2008) (arguing
China's actions violate § 16 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for
Internationally Wrongful Acts).
102.
See Aiken, supra note 44, at 105 (noting that "despite the country's rich
deposits of natural resources, two-thirds of Nigerians live in poverty"). Nigeria is the
third largest producer of liquefied natural gas in the world, and is currently vying for
the number two spot. See Emeka Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria's

Emergence as a Major Gas Power: Promise, Peril or Paradoxof Plenty?, 21 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 416-17 (2009) (describing Nigeria's export-driven growth in the
natural gas sector, with China being a major purchaser).
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sector.103 In hundreds of separate incidents, around eleven million
gallons of oil-"equivalent to an Exxon Valdez"-are spilled in
Nigeria each year. 10 4 By 2008, over two thousand sites across the
country were contaminated, often due to burst pipelines and wellhead
explosions. 10 5 Companies operating the sites often blame "social
instability," especially sabotage by "militants, thieves, or individuals
hoping to collect remediation costs." 106
However, a significant
portion of spills are probably due to concealed "equipment or
operational failures" on the part of the refineries. 10 7
The
environmental and health-related impacts of these spills can be quite
severe. They have contaminated the water supply of the Niger Delta
with heavy metals and other toxins, killing fish and increasing
incidences of cancer, respiratory, and skin-related ailments among
locals. 10 8 The spills also kill crops, render large areas "unusable for
agriculture for several years," and hamper the long-term productivity
109
of the soil in a region that is heavily dependent on agriculture.
Another practice with various negative consequences is "gas
flaring," the deliberate ignition of spouts of natural gas produced as
waste during oil extraction. 110 Nigeria is second only to Russia in

103.
See Lisa Stevens, The Illusion of Sustainable Development: How Nigeria's
Environmental Laws Are Failing the Niger Delta, 36 VT. L. REV. 387, 406-07 (2011)
(urging the Nigerian government to follow through on its 1989 sustainable
development pledge).
104.
Reagan R. Demas, Moment of Truth: Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
and CriticalAlterations Needed in Application of the ForeignCorrupt PracticesAct and
Other Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 315, 328 (2011); see Shell
Agrees $84m Deal over Niger Delta Oil Spill, BBC (Jan. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Shell
Agrees], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-30699787 [perma.cc/GS9G-ECFJ] (archived
Jan. 28, 2016) (reporting on a settlement Royal Dutch Shell made to fishermen in
Ogoniland region, equivalent to $3,300 for each).
105.
See Stevens, supra note 103, at 392 (discussing briefly the causes of oilrelated environmental disasters inNigeria).
106.
Id. Despite its oil wealth, the Niger Delta is one the poorest regions in the
world. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, NIGER DELTA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 35-39
(2006) (discussing the increasing incidence of poverty in the region, as well the
population's growing dissatisfaction with the status quo).
107.
Stevens, supra note 103, at 392; see also Larisa Wick, Human Rights
Violations in Nigeria: Corporate Malpractice and State Acquiescence in the Oil
Producing Deltas of Nigeria, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 63, 72 (2003) (asserting that spills
are more often caused by the use of faulty pipes, resulting in continuous leaks).
108.
Stevens, supra note 103, at 392-94 (referring to "grease, phenolic
compounds, cyanide, sulphide, suspended solids, chromium, and biological oxygendemanding organic matter.").
109.
Id.; see U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 106, at 25-26 (noting that
"[1]inks between their operations and human deprivation in some areas of the delta has
local raised [sic] expectations that the oil companies should contribute to physical and
human development in affected communities.").
110.
See Stevens, supra note 103, at 393 ("Over 70% of natural gas is still flared
in the Niger Delta, and Nigeria is the site of 25% of the gas flared in the world. In
many places, gas flaring has occurred '24 hours a day for over 35 years."').
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Gas flares release large amounts of
amount of gas flaring.'1 1
greenhouse gasses into the air, promote acid rain, and disrupt
ecosystems and peoples' lives because of their extreme noise and
heat. 112 A somewhat-dated report from 2005 estimated that gas
flaring from seventeen sites in just one Nigerian state contributed to
forty-nine premature deaths, eight cancer cases, thousands of
respiratory ailments, and hundreds of thousands of asthma attacks
annually. 113

These environmental concerns cannot easily be laid at China's
feet, however. It is far from the only country to have large operations
in the Niger Delta. 114 Activities like gas flaring by ExxonMobil,
Chevron, or especially Shell have received media attention in recent
116
years. 115 Various Chinese petroleum firms operating in Nigeria
may be creating similar problems, but if so they have escaped much
attention. Furthermore, any connection between Chinese operations
in South Africa and environmental problems in that country are even
more attenuated. 1 17 In fact, the opposite appears to be true due to
China's investments in clean energy there. 118 Nevertheless, Chinese
firms have shown a greater willingness to accept risks in setting up

111.
See BIRNUR BUZcu-GUVEN ET AL., BAKER INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, GAS
FLARING AND VENTING: EXTENT, IMPACTS, AND REMEDIES 16, 21 [hereinafter GAS
FLARING REPORT] (discussing trends in gas flaring practices around the world).
See Stevens, supra note 103, at 393 (describing the environmental and
112.
human rights consequences of gas flaring).
113.
But see GAS FLARING REPORT, supra note 111, at 11 (noting that this was a
conservative estimate).
114.
See Stevens, supra note 103, at 390 (noting that "Royal Dutch Shell
remains the country's dominant oil company."); Howard Mustoe, Shell 'Warned Nigeria
Pipeline Could Leak Before Spills', BBC (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/
business-29997074 [perma.cc/J9B5-W6L4] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (discussing an
environmental disaster caused by a Shell pipeline in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria).

115.

See Monica Mark, Nigeria's Penalty for Gas Flaring Will Not Curb

Emissions, Say Campaigners, GUARDIAN (May 31, 2012) http://www.theguardian.com
environment/2012/mayl3l/nigeria-penalty-gas-flaring [perma.cc173X2-32BW] (archived
Jan. 28, 2016) ("Oil companiess [sic] ExxonMobil, Shell and Chevron between them
flared 23.5bn cubic feet of gas in January [2012] alone, according to the state oil firm,
the Nigerian National Petroleum Company.").
116.
See Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 528 (discussing
longstanding ties between Nigeria and both Petrochina and CNOOC); Gdraldine Amiel,

Total Sells Stake in Nigerian Project to Sinopec for $2.5 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19,
2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732335320457812871
0317897372 [perma.cc/K4YM-XCYT] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (discussing Sinopec's new
interest in Nigerian offshore oil).
117.
See, e.g., Brittany D. Botterill, Comment, South Africa's Electricity Crisis:

The Need to Reconcile Environmental Policy Decisions with International Treaties, 4
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 225, 237-44 (2013) (discussing South Africa's
continued extensive use of coal power and its inability, or unwillingness, to adequately
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol).
118.
See supra Part III.
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new operations in Nigeria. 1 19 After all, Chinese demand for Nigerian
oil had been "expected to rise tenfold to 200,000 barrels a day by
2015"12 0-though it may not have reached that level due to the
country's economic slowdown that year. 121 Beyond the oil industry,
Chinese firms in Nigeria have also allegedly dumped "untreated
effluents" from logging into rivers, and violated numerous other
occupational health and pollution standards. 12 2 Thus, one could infer
that China's increased interest and investment in Nigerian oil has
likely contributed to environmental degradation in the Niger Delta,
123 but only to an uncertain extent. It is very difficult to point to
precise incidents or determine the scale of their contributions to
Nigeria's environmental woes.
2. Labor Rights Violations
Chinese companies involved in a range of industries, particularly
construction, have established presences in South Africa. 124 Because

See Kelley, supra note 21, at 38 ("Unlike many Western companies,
119.
Chinese companies are willing to take more risk and will work in more politically
unstable regions."); Stevens, supra note 103, at 391 ("Nigeria is negotiating with the
Chinese National Offshore Oil Cooperation (Cnooc Ltd.), the third largest national oil
company in China, to develop onshore oil blocks that other companies consider too
dangerous due to militant attacks.").
China and Nigeria Sign $1.1bn Deal, BBC (July 11, 2013),
120.
http://www.bbe.com/news/world-africa-23269004 [perma.cc/4LB6-CJMK] (archived Jan.
28, 2016). However, due to the downturn in the Chinese economy and the fall in oil
prices in 2015, future sales to China are up in the air. See Julia Payne & Libby George,
UPDATE 2-Nigeria's NNPC Issues 2016 Crude Oil Contracts Worth $13.5 Billion,
REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2015, 12:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-crudecontracts-idUSL8N14628L20151217 [perma.cc/D9WP-8NMJ] (archived Jan. 28, 2016)
(noting that Nigeria has yet to release how many barrels per day it will contract to
China in 2016); see also Five Ways China's Economic Crisis Will Affect Africa, BBC
(Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34060934 [perma.cc/BF9UNVME] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (predicting what impact China's financial distress
might have on its African partners, particularly South Africa); Patrick McGroarty et
al., Fall in Oil Prices Threatens Africa's Economic Growth, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fall-in-oil-prices-threatens-africas-economicPM),
8:30
growth-1418347811 [perma.ccIUG3L-ZLU7] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (discussing the
impact of falling oil prices on the Nigerian economy).
121.
See Andrew Walker, China's Slowdown and Cheap Oil, BBC (Aug. 26,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/newslbusiness-34060921 [perma.cc/D692-7CQ3] (archived
Jan. 28, 2016) (suggesting Nigeria may face financial hardships as China's decreasing
demand impacts oil prices).
Obiorah et al., supra note 5, at 291.
122.
See Stevens, supra note 103, at 391 ("[China's] continued development in
123.
already unstable areas of the Niger Delta will inevitably lead to further instability and
environmental degradation.").
See Tonya Rodgers, Note, The Center Cannot Hold: Assessing the Reach of
124.
China's Labor Protections to Migrant Workers in Africa, 35 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1075,
1094 (2012) (listing "energy, mining and metallurgy, electronics, telecommunications,
commercial banking, shipping, light manufacturing, and automobiles" as well as textile
factories).
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of the latter country's extremely high unemployment rate, employees
at Chinese firms there have little bargaining power without union
support.125 Local employees are reportedly "routinely" paid below
minimum wage and denied benefits and skills training. 126 Ironically,
the workers treated most poorly at these firms are often themselves
Chinese. 1 27 Skilled or semi-skilled Chinese migrant laborers are
frequently shipped overseas to work in South Africa without direct
access to either their passports or their salaries. 128 Though they are
paid higher wages than laborers employed in China proper, migrant
workers report being forced to work twelve to sixteen hours a day
every day, being denied overtime pay, and having their movement
1
limited to onsite housing. 29
13
Similar labor abuses have reportedly occurred in Nigeria,
though again the precise of these occurrences scale is unclear. Major
Chinese firms operating in Nigeria include multiple state-owned oil
companies as well as various telecom, manufacturing, and
construction companies. 13 1 These firms' Nigerian operations "have
been increasingly accused of engaging in poor labor practices, harsh
treatment of employees, low, wages, and poor standards of corporate
governance." 13 2
Chinese migrant laborers face similarly poor
conditions in Nigeria at the hands of Chinese firms. 133 Nigerian
labor unions have also vociferously complained that Chinese
companies discriminate against Nigerians in terms of both salary and
the possibility of advancement. 13 4
While China certainly faces
frequent criticisms for its labor practices in South Africa and Nigeria,

125.
See id. at 1095, 1095 n.101 (admitting that this is rather anecdotal, based
on the comments of "local workers and business owners").
126.
Id. at 1095.
127.
See id. at 1087-88 ("Where a project demands even minimal skill or
experience, however, Chinese companies rely heavily on Chinese laborers."). There are
at least several hundred thousand Chinese immigrants living in South Africa. See id.
at 1096 (claiming Chinese workers "represent a smaller part of the workforce[,] but
maintain a significant presence in Chinese companies").
128.
See id. at 1089-91 ("Despite the fact that labor contracts and
legislation ...are designed to regulate Chinese employers and the treatment of their
employees, this is commonly not the case.").
129.
See id. at 1090 n.78 (noting such treatment occurred in Mauritius, as well
as South Africa).
130.
Obiorah et al., supra note 5, at 280.
131.
See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 11-15 (describing the various sectors
of the Nigerian economy in which Chinese companies operate).
132.
Obiorah et al., supra note 5, at 280.
133.
See Rodgers, supra note 124, at 1090 n.77 (citing SERGE MICHEL & MICHEL
BEURET, CHINA SAFARI: ON THE TRAIL OF BEIJING'S EXPANSION IN AFRICA 71-94
(2009)).
134.
See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 18 ("Chinese companies vehemently
deny discriminating against Nigerian workers, arguing that salaries for both Chinese
and Nigerian employees are low, but in line with pay rates in Nigerian manufacturing
companies.").
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most accusations are apparently based on anecdotal evidence.
Nonetheless, reports concerning migrant laborers are especially
indicative of labor rights violations occurring under the noses of
South African and Nigerian authorities, even if most documented
abuses are against non-citizens. Fortunately, Chinese labor practices
in South Africa and Nigeria involve fewer blatant labor rights
135
violations than in other African nations.
B. "Ruinous"Competition and Other Economic Concerns
The frequency with which cheap Chinese goods are "dumped" on
136
domestic markets is a growing concern among many African firms.
As African nations have reduced barriers to trade to better integrate
with global markets, the possibility of dumping has become much
more acute. 137 Some researchers suggest that Chinese dumping is
beneficial because "a broader spectrum of the population can now
afford certain consumption or household items[,] and in this way
trade with China has contributed to people's well-being." 138 Those

See Brian Chama, Economic Development at the Cost of Human Rights:
135.
China Nonferrous Metal Industry in Zambia, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 2, 3-6 (2010)
(describing human rights and labor abuses allegedly perpetrated by the company
China Nonferrous Metal Industry against Zambian miners in the early 2000s, such as
locking them into the mine at night and killing striking workers). Chinese firms'
treatment of mine workers in nations such as Zambia have stirred outrage
domestically, and have been reported extensively abroad. See id. ("[Zambian] Regional
Minister Alice Simango, who visited the [China-owned Collum Coal Mine Industries
mining] site, reported that '[t]he workers are kept like pigs and subjected to a
dangerous environment. They are kicked and beaten as though they are not human
beings."'); see also China Mines in Zambia 'Unsafe' Says Human Rights Watch, BBC
(Nov. 3, 2011) [hereinafter China Mines], http://www.bbc.comlnews/world-africa15569310 [perma.cc/Z9Q3-47AB] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (reporting on numerous
alleged violations of Zambian work hour limits and safety rules by China Non-Ferrous
Metals Mining Corporation).
See Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 577 (noting
136.
that one-seventh of all anti-dumping cases before the WTO between 1995 and 2004
involved Chinese products). "Dumping" is the importation or sale by foreign-owned
firms of goods at prices far below what domestic firms can sustain. See Christian C.D.
Petersen, African Dumping Grounds: South Africa's Struggle Against Unfair Trade, 14
B.U. INT'L L.J. 375, 379-83 (1996) (describing some of the rationales for and against
antidumping policies).
Cf. Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 577
137.
(questioning whether African nations have the institutional capability to resist
dumping). Liberal economists frequently argue that for African nations to accumulate
capital, keep skilled workers, and improve their technology base, they must resist
protectionist impulses and relinquish direct controls on domestic markets. See Alec R.
Johnson, Comment, Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties in Sub-SaharanAfrica,
59 EMORY L.J. 919, 953-54 (2010) ("Market forces encourage specialization by those
producers that have a comparative advantage; and this specialization-rather than the
redistribution of existing wealth-fuels development through the creation of new
wealth.").
GRIMM ETAL., supra note 9, at 17.
138.

522

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:499

opposed to dumping argue that it is unfair to domestic industries and
distorts markets. 1 39 Others counter that anti-dumping policies shield
inefficient companies, discourage trade, and waste resources. 140
Nigerian companies are increasingly complaining of dumping by
Chinese companies, though both nations have accused the other of
selling substandard products. 14 1 Chinese firms' apparent disregard
of import/export regulations has also supported the Nigerian black
market.142 Many of these affordable Chinese imports are very low
quality-for example, faulty Chinese wiring and power strips may be
causing dozens of fires a year in Lagos. 143 Nigeria's textile industry
has been particularly vulnerable to the importing of cheap Chinese
cotton products. 14 4 The industry has shrunk from around 175 plants
employing 250,000 people in the 1980s, down to only twenty-six
plants and 24,000 workers by 2007.145 The decline has largely been
blamed on China. 146 Though around 300,000 Nigerians are employed
by Chinese companies, allegedly over 350,000 manufacturing jobs
have been lost in recent years due to Chinese competition,

139.
See Petersen, supra note 136, at 381-82 (noting that "antidumping duties
remain an important mechanism for governments to prevent harmful and trade
distorting practices.").
140.
See id. ("Antidumping duties have a protectionist effect which hinders
global trade, particularly when a nation persists in bringing antidumping actions even
though 'the alleged dumper is acting in an economically rational manner."').
141.
This resulted in a 2009 agreement against fake products exported to
Nigeria from China. See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 18 ('While China
acknowledges the problem, it says that Nigerian importers often pressure Chinese
suppliers to produce lower quality products in order to reduce the prices to a level
Nigerians can afford.").
142.
See Obiorah et al., supra note 5, at 280 (including in CDs, stamps, and
computer equipment).
143.
See Keith Bradsher & Adam Nossiter, In Nigeria, Chinese Investment
Comes with a Downside, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com2015/12/
06/business/internationallin-nigeria-chineseinvestment-comes-with-a-downside.html?_
r=0 [https:!Hperma.cc/UZK2-NAMA] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (detailing a variety of
downsides of Chinese investment in Nigeria, including shoddy or counterfeit products,
possible corruption, and unemployment).
144.
See Obiorah et al., supra note 5, at 279-80 (describing the closure of large
numbers of Nigerian textile plants in the 1990s and 2000s); Dulue Mbachu, Nigerian
Resources: Changing the Playing Field, 13 S. AFR. J. INT'L AFF. 77, 80 (2006) ("Chinese
exporters have been accused of dumping goods, particularly textiles, in Nigeria."); The

Chinese in Africa: Trying to Pull

Together, ECONOMIST

(Apr. 20,

2011),

http://www.economist.com/node/18586448
[https://perma.cc/PKES-632W]
(archived
Jan. 28, 2016) ("Hundreds of textile factories across Nigeria collapsed in recent years
because they could not compete with cheap Chinese garments. Many thousands of jobs
were lost.").
145.
Obiorah, et al., supra note 5, at 280 (noting that the number of active,
Nigerian-owned textile mills was projected to fall below six by 2008).
146.
See id. at 292 (suggesting the continued dumping of Chinese manufactured
goods "could provoke a public backlash against the growing Chinese immigrant
community" in Nigeria).
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particularly in that industry. 147 But it is also worth noting that
Nigeria's population is around 177 million, indicating these are not
14 8
truly disastrous changes.
Since the mid-1990s, as textiles and similar industries have
declined, South African firms have likewise alleged they are suffering
due to the dumping of Chinese products. 149 The textile industry has
lost an estimated 75,000 jobs in recent years. 150 By contrast, South
African regulations-more robust than in many neighboring
countries-have caused many Chinese firms to retreat from the
country over time. 15 1 As previously mentioned, China is very
interested in accessing South Africa's mineral resources. However,
multinational
well-established
several
hosts
South Africa
corporations, such as the mining corporation Anglo-American, that
have maintained competitive advantages over their Chinese
counterparts. 152 Overall, its manufacturing sector has proven more
resilient to Chinese advances than other nations due to its greater
capacity. 153 Nonetheless, in the period from 1992 to 2010, Chinese
imports have adversely affected employment in forty-four separate
154
labor-intensive industries in South Africa.

147.
See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 18 (providing the caveat that these
figures were supplied by Nigerian labor unions).
See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [CIA], WORLD FACT BOOK: NIGERIA
148.
(2016), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html [https:/
perma.cc/K67C-FLJR] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (providing Nigeria's vital statistics as of
June 2014).
See Petersen, supra note 136, at 377 n.11, 393 (specifically referring to
149.
Chinese towels and Acetaminophenol); see also GRIMM ET AL., supra note 9, at 17
(describing the "multifaceted implications for South Africa's domestic economy" trade
with China has brought).
See GRIMM ET AL., supra note 9, at 17.
150.
See Rodgers, supra note 124, at 1095 (contrasting South Africa's more well151.
established firms with the relative lack of strong competition and governance in other
African nations).
See, e.g., Launching Pad: Chinese Firms Have Stumbled Before in South
152.
Africa, but the Country's Gateway Position Keeps Drawing Them Back, CHINA ECON.
REV. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/content/launching-pad
[https://perma.cc/8MK9-2SNS] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) ("Yet the Chinese mining firms
that dominate entire economies elsewhere on the continent are often mere bit-players
in South Africa.").
153.
See GRIMM ET AL., supra note 9, at 19 ("South Africa, which has better a
[sic] manufacturing capacity than other African countries, has more competitive
advantages vis-A-vis China.").
See Pigato & Tang, supranote 52, at 7-8 (finding that Chinese firms have
154.
been able to undercut South African firms in everything from animals to wood
products).
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C. Promoting Corruptionand Hampering the Rule of Law
It is especially difficult to determine the extent to which Chinese
involvement has supported corruption in Nigeria and South Africa as
most such under-the-table deals are not likely to be discovered or
reported. 15 5
The existence of a relationship between Chinese
investment practices and perceived corruption remains murky.
Nonetheless, certain generalities regarding Chinese practices in
Africa that encourage corruption are perhaps applicable to South
Africa and Nigeria. It is highly likely that Chinese companies engage
15 6
in widespread bribery throughout Africa.
Corruption in Africa "cuts across all facets of the society-public
and private-and exists in the political, economic, social, religious,
and cultural spheres."' 157
"Grand" corruption, calling to mind
"rapacious dictators who bleed their countries dry of valuable natural
resources and shelter their ill-gotten gains in Swiss bank accounts,"
is not the primary concern in (admittedly imperfect) democracies like
Nigeria and South Africa. 158 Corruption in these countries is more
often "petty": tax evasion, bribery, turning a blind eye to regulations,
and general "gift-giving, favoritism and influence peddling."'1 59 This
petty corruption is more severe in Nigeria than South Africa-though
again, it is endemic throughout the continent. 160

155.
Thus, "perceived" corruption is a more reliable metric. See generally
TRANSPARENCY
INT'L,
CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS
INDEX
2014
(2014),
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014 [https://perma.cc/ADK7-Z45U] (archived Jan. 28,
2016) (ranking countries by perceived corruption, with the highest score the most
corrupt). "The 2014 [Corruption Perceptions Index] draws on data sources from
independent institutions specialising in governance and business climate analysis."
TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2014: IN DETAIL (2014),
[https://perma.cc/SNK4http://www.transparency.org/cpi20l4/indetail#myAnchor1
M9PS] (archived Jan. 28, 2016).
See Won Kidane & Weidong Zhu, China-Africa Investment Treaties: Old
156.
Rules, New Challenges, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1035, 1075-76 (2014) ("It is fair to
assume that much of that money comes from western multinationals but it is also clear
that Chinese companies are increasing their share on that front. For example, a recent
TI report ranks Chinese firms towards the bottom of the transparency scale.").
157.
Nsongurua J. Udombana, Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa's AntiCorruption Convention, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 447, 450 (2003); see also Osita
Nnamani Ogbu, Combating Corruption in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal of the Laws,
Institutions, and the PoliticalWill, 14 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 101 (2008) ('The
World Bank has defined corruption as 'the abuse of public office for private gain."').
158.
Thomas Kelley, Corruption as Institution Among Small Businesses in
Africa, 24 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 35 (2012).
159.
Id.
160.
Compare CORRUPTION BY COUNTRY/TERRITORY: NIGERIA, supra note 100
(reporting that, as of 2013, Nigeria ranks 144 out of 177 countries on the Corruption
Perceptions Index), with TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION BY COUNTRY/TERRITORY:
SOUTH AFRICA, http://www.transparency.org/country#ZAF [https://perma.cc/NMK5U7VN] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (reporting that, as of 2014, South Africa ranks 67 out
of 175 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index).
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South Africa's problems with corruption are much less serious
than those of either China or Nigeria. 16 1 However, corruption there
is perhaps more visible than in other African nations, due to South
Africa's free press and the fact that many scandals involved top
officials. For instance, the term of current President Jacob Zuma has
been rocked repeatedly by corruption scandals. 162 Bribery rates are
low by African standards; 15 percent of South Africans paid a bribe in
163
2013 compared to an average of 30 percent across the continent.
Nonetheless, bribery remains a serious concern to South Africa in
general.164 The diversion of public funds is an even more serious
problem. 165 The non-governmental organization Corruption Watch
has estimated that in 2011 as much as 25 to 30 billion rand
(approximately 1.5 to 1.8 billion in today's dollars) was lost from the
However,
procurement budget due to this form of corruption. 166
there is so far no direct evidence of a connection between Chinese
practices in South Africa and these concerns.
Nigeria has a far more serious corruption problem. 167 Its
judiciary has proven particularly vulnerable to intimidation by
wealthy individuals, bribery, and political pressures. 168 The nation

See CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2014, supra note 155 (giving South
161.
Africa a rank of 67 in perceived corruption, China a rank of 100, and Nigeria a rank of
136). Note that both South Africa and Nigeria were perceived as less corrupt than in
2013.
162.
Prior to the 2009 elections, charges of "corruption, bribery, money
laundering and racketeering" were brought against Zuma, but were later dropped.
Mark Tran, Prosecutors Drop Jacob Zuma Corruption Charges, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6,
2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/06/zuma-corruption.charges-dropped
[https://perma.cc/9KTA.HASM] (archived Jan. 28, 2016). In 2014, his presidency was
again shaken by reports he used public funds in a multi-million-dollar refurbishment of
his residence. Zuma's South African Nkandla Home Upgrade 'Unethical', BBC (Mar.
[https://perma.cc/38AZ19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26645400
2Q4V] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) ("In a more than 400-page report, Public Protector
Thuli Madonsela accused Mr. Zuma of unethical conduct. She said that Mr. Zuma, who
faces re-election in May, should repay costs for some of the unnecessary renovations.").
163.
See Gareth Newham, Why Is Corruption Getting Worse in South Africa?,
CORRUPTION WATCH (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/why-iscorruption-getting-worse-in-south-africa [https://perma.cc/6UZQ-5WRA] (archived Jan.
28, 2016) (comparing South Africa favorably to Sierra Leone, where 63 percent of
people have to pay bribes each year).
See Demas, supra note 104, at 356 n.217 (referring to a report describing
164.
the systematic failure to prosecute bribery-related offenses in South Africa).
165.
See Newham, supra note 163 (arguing that public awareness of fraud on
this scale has driven the country's worsening corruption perception scores).
166.
See id. (citing former head of the Special Investigating Unit, Willie
Hofmeyer).
167.
See Demas, supra note 104, at 323 (quoting Hillary Clinton, then the U.S.
Secretary of State, calling Nigeria's corruption problem "unbelievable").
168.
See Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in TransitionalSocieties: An Analysis
of the Problems and Failuresof the Judiciaryin Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 9, 24-39
(2005) (describing the many sources of judicial corruption that led to it being the norm
in Nigeria).
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loses an estimated 40 percent of its wealth each year to "corruption
and government mismanagement." 169 Though Nigeria is projected to
have taken in 52 billion dollars in revenue from oil exports in 2015,
this amount is significantly lower than revenue in 2014 due to the
decline in oil prices, and it is impossible to know exactly how much
the country produces or refines each year because hundreds
thousands of barrels are stolen every day. 170 Oil revenues make up
over 70 percent of the government budget, and because the stateowned Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) is a partner in
every petroleum-related project, officials have easy access to that
revenue. 17 1 Incumbent politicians are able to skim money for reelection, and many such projects are apparently set up more for
political points than profit. 172 As recently as October 2015, the
country's minister of petroleum from 2010 to 2015 was arrested in
London for bribery and money laundering, 173 and an audit recently
determined that 19 billion dollars in oil revenue is simply missing
from the government's accounts. 174 Even nominally-foreign ventures
are typically up to 60 percent state-owned, with the foreign company

169.
Demas, supra note 104, at 321.
170.
See INT'L MONETARY FUND [IMF], IMF COUNTRY REPORT No. 15/84, at 10
(2015) [hereinafter IMF REPORT ON NIGERIA] (noting the decline in revenue has
reduced GDP by six percentage points); Can Nigeria's President Defeat Oil Industry
Corruption?, BBC (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34580862
[https://perma.cc/XPB8-FMWE] (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (describing how new president
Muhammadu Buhari has taken personal control of the oil ministry in an attempt to
combat corruption).
171,
See IMF REPORT ON NIGERIA, supra note 170, 3 n.10 (using 2013 numbers
for government revenue); Demas, supra note 104, at 328 (concluding this single-minded
focus on the oil and natural gas industry is not sustainable); Keenan, supra note 98, at
112 ("Such an ownership structure is perfectly rational from the perspective of a
politician concerned with staying in power, but it can undermine political
accountability for two primary reasons. First, only incumbent politicians (and their
allies) have access to resource rents ....Second, potential challengers to incumbents
see the same landscape as do incumbents.").
See Keenan, supra note 99, at 118-19 ("Politicians have an incentive to
172.
champion such projects, even when the projects lose money, because they demonstrate
a politician's ability to channel resources to his allies. This problem is exacerbated
when states such as China provide financing for projects that are directed by
politicians.").

173.

See Nigeria'sEx-Oil Minister "Arrestedin London, BBC (Oct. 2, 2015), http:

[https://perma.cc/GJD7-ULPC] (archived
//www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34430597
Jan. 28, 2016) ("Recently, new Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari vowed to trace
and recover what he called the 'mindboggling' sums that have been stolen from the oil
sector.").

174.

See Drew Hinshaw, Nigerian Oil-Revenue Audit Report Published, WALL

ST.J. (Apr. 27, 2015, 3:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nigerian-oil-revenue-auditreport-published-1430164157 [https:/Iperma.cc/QU2C-H8XN] (archived Jan. 28, 2016)
("The report caps a year-long political debate over how Africa's top oil exporter
manages its revenue, a debate that help lead [sic] to President Goodluck Jonathan's
ouster last month.").
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17 5
usually bearing most or all costs, including paying royalties.
Chinese firms must frequently give the Nigerian government
concessional loans in exchange for the right to drill a promising oil
block. 17 6 This suggests that China may be, in part, a victim of
Nigerian corruption.
However, China's operations in Nigeria likely provide many
opportunities for local officials to divert public funds. Lines of credit
it has provided for drilling rights or infrastructure projects are
typically unconditional-the money is not required to be spent or
177
accounted for transparently, as other donors sometimes require.
Nor does China generally monitor whether individuals have
inappropriately enriched themselves with funds from Chinese
projects. 17 8
Thus, some scholars have argued that Chinese
investments prop up poorly managed projects and encourage rentseeking by African officials, including in Nigeria. 17 9 Progress on
many of the infrastructure projects China agreed to undertake in the
last decade in that country has been slow, as "much of the money has
180
disappeared into Nigeria's notoriously corrupt political machines."
In this light, Chinese investments in Nigeria function more like
"political slush funds than arms-length investments designed to
generate a financial return."18 1 It is unclear how many and to what
extent Chinese investments in Nigeria are illusory like this.
The potential for Chinese investment to foster corruption is one
facet of the "resource curse": nations with abundant natural
resources, especially oil, may nonetheless see their industries

175.
See id. at 115-16 (referring specifically to the arrangement Nigeria
typically has with Chinese firms)
See id. at 118 (describing the ease with which government investments
176.
may be diverted to the pockets of corrupt officials).
177.
See Demas, supra note 104, at 345-46 (noting that project loans are
occasionally conditioned upon the host nation purchasing equipment from other
Chinese companies, but also that this is usually arranged in secret). The only common
condition is that all of China's partners must accept its "One China" policy. See Ofodile,
Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supranote 6, at 533-34 (citing FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA
COOPERATION, CHINA's AFRICAN POLICY (2006), http://www.focac.org/eng/zt/zgdfzz
cwj/t230479.htm [https://perma.cc/UPF8-NF8J] (archived Feb. 7, 2016)) ('The one
China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of
China's relations with African countries and regional organizations.").
Keenan, supra note 99, at 94-96 C'China's approach not only provides
178.
potentially corrupt leaders more opportunities to enrich themselves, it also does not
hold accountable those leaders who do so.").
179.
See Demas, supra note 104, at 346 ("The opaqueness of China's
engagement in Africa therefore facilitates corruption in states where the rule of law is
already severely inhibited. Furthermore, by offering 'no questions asked' cash deals to
regimes, China erodes African states' incentives to implement a rule of law or combat
corruption.").
180.
Obiorah et al., supra note 5, at 292.
181.
Keenan, supranote 99, at 118.
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In Nigeria,

China's unconditional investments in the oil and gas industry
exacerbate problems caused by the "presence of natural resources in a
country without strong public institutions and accountability for
public officials." 183 The resource curse is also a problem in South
Africa despite its relatively high level of development, due to the
country's substantial mineral reserves. 18 4 "[T]he negative sociopolitical effects of resource endowment . . . remain prevalent in South
Africa, including; corruption, a loss of natural capital, disaffection in
mining communities, mine-related violence and the increasing
application of military expenditure to the control of domestic law and
order." 18 5 In this way, fostering corruption is less of a deliberate
choice by Chinese firms, and more of an unavoidable consequence of
how they are presently engaged in the Nigerian and South African
economies. 18 6 In nations dependent on "the extraction and
exportation of natural resources and resulting influx of foreign
currency," this often leads to a "frenzied political contest for the
incoming cash." 18 7 On the other hand, China lacks an equivalent to
the U.S. Federal Corrupt Practices Act and often fails to enforce anti-

182.
This is often ascribed to economic overspecialization, in addition to the
corruption that such wealth can incentivize. See Halvor Mehlum et al., Cursed by
Resources or Institutions?, 29 WORLD ECON. 1117, (2006) ("On average resource-rich
economies have lower growth, worse institutions and more conflict than resource-poor
economies. Thus, empirically, being rich in natural resources is associated with being
poor in material wealth-the 'paradox of plenty.' Behind this pattern we find the usual
suspects such as oil-rich ... Nigeria."); 'The Resource Curse. Why Africa's Oil Riches
Don't Trickle Down to Africans, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON BLOG (Oct. 31, 2007),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-resource-curse-why-africas-oil-richesdont-trickle-down-to-africans/ [https:/perma.cc/H39S-WMLW] (archived Jan. 28, 2016)
("Even Nigeria, where the oil industry has operated for decades, probably wouldn't be
able to adapt the Norwegian model [of saving a portion of oil revenues in a national
pension fund] ....

Little of the oil wealth gets invested back into the [Niger] delta and

few of the companies employ local people.").
183.
Demas, supra note 104, at 347.
See Ainsley D. Elbra, The Forgotten Resource Curse: South Africa's Poor
184.
Experience with Mineral Extraction, 38 RESOURCES POLY 549, 549-57

(2013)

(concluding that South Africans continue to have unequal access to the nation's
mineral wealth, resulting in slower-than-expected growth, despite its status as a
middle income nation).
185.
See id. at 550, 554 ("In addition to the economic effects of mineral
extraction, and the inability for resource wealth to alleviate poverty, South Africa
suffers from many incarnations of the rentier state outlined in the literature [such as
'myopic spending, weakening of institutions aimed at ensuring checks and balances
and even the increased likelihood of civil conflict].").
See, e.g., Aiken, supra note 44, at 111 ("China, in particular, could increase
186.
instability in West and Central African oil-producing nations .... While Western
policies towards oil development in Africa have historically been less than ,deal, 'there
is virtually no way around the conclusion that China's massive return to Africa
presents a negative political development' that is unlikely to create lasting stability.").
187.
Demas, supra note 104, at 326.
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corruption standards on the operations of its own companies on the
18 8
continent, which worsens the problem.

IV. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN NIGERIA AND
SOUTH AFRICA
It is difficult to account for legal reactions by Nigeria and South
Africa specifically to Chinese actions. Therefore, this Part focuses on
domestic legal measures these countries have taken to resist the
overall problems to which China may be contributing, based on the
issues explored in Part III. In particular, it discusses environmental
laws in Nigeria and the role of the courts, labor laws, and unions in
both countries, as well as their various attempts to curb corruption.
These legal measures have often been unsuccessful because of
structural flaws or a lack of respect for the rule of law in these
countries. Additionally, this Part discusses the BITs between China,
Nigeria, and South Africa and their potential use as regulatory tools.
BITs can be used to encourage positive political changes within host
nations that might reduce some of the aforementioned costs of
Chinese involvement, or promote the rule of law such that domestic
solutions to these problems become more viable. However, China's
current BITs with Nigeria and South Africa were not written with
such purposes in mind.
A. EnvironmentalRegulation in Nigeria
On paper, at least, Nigeria has extensive environmental
The centerpiece of its regime is the National
protections. 189
Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency
(NESREA), which centrally enforces environmental laws and
promotes sustainable development. 190 However, the oil and gas
industry, on which Nigeria's growth is dependent, is largely excluded
Instead, the Department of
from oversight by NESREA. 191
Petroleum Resources (DPR), charged with developing that sector, has
sole oversight and regulatory power over it. 19 2 This relationship is

See id. at 337.
188.
189.
See Stevens, supra note 103, at 395 ("Nigeria has an impressive number of
environmental statutes for a developing country.").
See id. (describing the succession of Nigerian environmental laws leading
190.
up to the creation of the NESREA).
191.
See id. at 397 ("Nigeria's sole environmental agency is thereby bafflingly
prevented from participating in the cleanup of any pollution caused by the oil and gas
industry.").
192.
See id. at 398 (citing Amnesty International, which argues this
partnership "fundamentally conflicts with the concept of an independent body
regulating the industry").
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not conducive to stringent environmental regulation. All of the
country's oil and mineral resources are government property, and
foreign firms must be licensed by the DPR to "ensure compliance with
the applicable laws and regulations in line with good oil producing
practices."'19 3 Perhaps due to cozy relations between the DPR and oil
companies, the actual number of spills may be much higher than
reported; many spills are never reported.194 The DPR has authority
to oversee cleanups, but the sanctions available to it in case of
noncompliance vary by circumstances. 19 5 A 1992 Environmental
Impact Assessment Decree requires the DPR to "impartially review"
most oil and gas development activities (including those by Chinese
firms). 19 6 These assessments are subject to similar requirements to
assessments in the United States, including examining all likely
impacts, considering alternatives, determining if mitigation would be
possible, noting any uncertainties, and determining if the activities
would adversely affect parties outside Nigeria. 197 However, it is
unclear if this really amounts to a constraint on pollution. 198 Though
the assessments are supposed to encourage public engagement in
projects that affect the environment, in practice most Nigerians are
unaware of their right to object such projects, and many cannot even
99
read the assessments. 1
Still, Nigeria's response to its environmental problems has been
more effective at times. Nigeria has actually had more success in
reducing the incidence of gas flaring since banning the practice in the
1984, investing in a satellite tracking system and imposing nearly
one billion dollars in fines a year. 2 00 Between 1994 and 2009, flaring
volume declined by 15 billion cubic meters. 20 1 The courts have

193.
ORGANIZATION
ROLES,
DEP'T
OF
PETROLEUM
RESOURCES,
http://www.dprnigeria.com/dpr-roles.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
194.
See Wick, supra note 107, at 72.
195.
See Stevens, supra note 103, at 398-402 (discussing the inconsistent and
often lax penalties oil companies may face for violating various environmental
statutes).
196.
Id. at 401.

197.
See Peter Eddie Aldinger, Addressing Environmental Justice Concerns in
Developing Countries: Mining in Nigeria, Ugandaand Ghana, 26 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 345, 366 (2014) (stating that public participation is supposed to be encouraged
during these assessments).
198.
See Stevens, supra note 103, at 401-02 (expressing skepticism about how
zealously the DPR enforces this law).
199.
See Aldinger, supra note 197, at 367 n.116 (claiming that these
assessments are highly vulnerable to "exclusionary practices").

200.

See Daniel Magnowski, Nigeria Employs Satellite to Chase $1 Billion Gas

Flaring Fines, BLOOMBERG Bus. (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-11-27/nigeria-employs-satellite-to-chase- 1-billion-gas-flaring-fines
[https://perma.cc/Q84H-GA39 (archived Jan. 28, 2016) (noting the United Kingdom is
providing funds for the satellite project).
201.
See GAS FLARING REPORT, supra note 111, at 15-16, 21 (showing that
Nigeria was among seventeen countries exhibiting a downward trend in gas flaring
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provided some recourse to many victims of environmental
destruction. 20 2 In 2005, for instance, the Federal High Court of
Nigeria held in Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Corporation
that the constitution guaranteed a "right to [a] clean, poison-free,
pollution-free and healthy environment," and that Shell had violated
the petitioner's rights through gas flaring. 203 More recently, Shell
settled with the victims of oil spills in 2008 and 2009 for 84 million
dollars. 20 4 Typically, however, Nigerian courts have "seemed to
prefer
corporate
economic
concerns
over
environmental
protection." 20 5 Thus, such outcomes appear to be rare and, as the
number of spills continues to rise, 2 0 6 do not seem to have had much
deterrent effect. Indeed, the appellate courts have since restrained
Gbemre's sweeping constitutional pronouncement, and that case
ground to a halt after the presiding trial judge was transferred and
20 7
the case file lost.
B. Labor and Other Rights Protections
South Africa has some of the most advanced labor rights
protections on the continent. 20 8
In fact, its 1996 Constitution
(drafted in response to the injustices of the Apartheid system) is one
of the only constitutions in the world to expressly establish fair labor
practices as an affirmative right. 20 9 The 1995 Labour Relations Act
(LRA) and the 1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA)

over this period). Nigeria accounted for ten percent of gas flaring worldwide in 2009.
See id. (comparing this to 146 billion cubic meters of total gas that year).
202.
See Stevens, supra note 103, at 403 ("The courts may also provide
compensation to victims of environmental destruction, ordering cessation of the
environmentally harmful activity or even requiring legislation to prohibit further
activity of that sort.").
203.
Id.
204.
See Shell Agrees, supra note 104 ("The deal, which ends a three-year legal
battle, is the first of its kind in Nigeria.").
205.
Stevens, supra note 103, at 403.
206.
See id. at 392 ("Shell admits that it spilled more than 14,000 tons of crude
oil in the Niger Delta in 2009, twice what it spilled in 2008 and more than four times
what it spilled in 2007. Shell attributes this increase to social instability in the Niger
Delta and claims that the majority of the oil spilled resulted from two incidents in
which militants bombed the Trans Escravos pipeline, a twenty-four-inch-wide pipeline
intended to channel oil across the Sahara Desert.").
207.
But see Eferiekose Ukala, Note, Gas Flaring in Nigeria's Niger Delta:
Failed Promises and Reviving Community Promises, 2 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY,
CLIMATE & ENV'T 97, 109-11 (2011) (noting that, shortly thereafter, an Alien Tort
Statute action in New York did effectively restrain Shell).
208.
See Rodgers, supra note 124, at 1107-08 ("Where [positive labor] laws do
not expressly provide a cause of action [for violation of a right], complainants may find
protections under common law and international law.").
209.
See id. at 1107-08 (referring to § 23(1) of the 1996 Constitution, which
states that "[e]veryone has the right to fair labour practices").
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define labor rights and provide for dispute resolution. 2 10
The
statutes mandate "in painstaking detail" substantive conditions, such
as wage, overtime, and rest interval provisions, that must be included
in all employment contracts. 21 1 Employment contracts in violation of
these statutes are invalid, and labor protections are supposed to
extend to all workers regardless of immigration status. 21 2 Thus, the
2 13
country seems capable of preventing exploitative labor practices.
The Minister of Labour has "general authority to monitor and report
on individual labor sectors, [though] exposure of violations largely
depends upon individuals or collective groups utilizing South Africa's
dual conciliation and court systems." 2 14 Beyond positive law, South
2 15
African labor unions are also politically strong.
Nonetheless, Chinese migrants and local laborers for Chinese
firms continue to face problems in South Africa. Often this is because
"[l]anguage and culture present seemingly insurmountable barriers"
to dispute resolution or conciliation, "as does fear of retaliation by
employers." 2 16
Resentment of migrant laborers, who are often
blamed for the high unemployment rate, may cause the justice
system to move less urgently to redress their complaints. 217 The
broader problem is simply that the Ministry of Labour is
"[c]hronically understaffed and underfunded," and "cannot effectively
monitor labor practices, especially when it comes to foreign
workers." 2 18 Even for South African workers, access to conciliation is
often inconsistent, possibly attributable to a "[l]ack of institutional
memory, insufficient resources, and fear of alienating large
transnational corporations." 2 19 Though the fundamentals of the

210.
See id. at 1109. ("[The LRA and BCEA give effect to the constitutional
guarantee to fair labor practices, in part, by explicitly defining employee rights and
employer obligations.").
211.
See id. at 1110 (explaining that workers can also claim common law
protections; thus, "[wihen the statutes fall short of providing legal coverage to Chinese
workers, the common law can extend fair labor protections").
212.
See id. at 1108-09 (explaining that South African laws governing labor
contracts are more protective of workers than equivalent Chinese laws).
213.
See id. at 1108 (noting that employment contracts in South Africa, even if
governed by foreign law, are null if in violation of statute).
214.
Id. at 1109-10.
215.
See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 94, at 22 (referencing the political alliance
between the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the dominant African
National Congress political party). However, this is less helpful as Chinese firms are
hostile to unionization. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 124, at 1096 n.104 (citing Thulani
Guliwe & Skhumbuzo Mkhonta, Chinese Investments in South Africa, in CHINESE
INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA: A LABOUR PERSPECTIVE 320-29 (Anthony Yaw Baah &

Herbert Jauch eds., 2009)).
216.
Rodgers, supra note 124, at 1116.
217.
See id. at 1113 (suggesting anti-Chinese sentiment exacerbates an
institutional inability to address labor grievances).
218.
Id. at 1112.
219.
Id.
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system appear sound on paper, enforcement remains intermittent
and access to dispute resolution remains difficult at times, even for
locals.
Nigerian labor and employment laws appear similarly welldeveloped on paper. The most important statute governing the
treatment of workers is the Labour Act. 220 Among other things,
Nigerian law establishes minimum work hours, requires termination
notice, prohibits most forms of discrimination, and sets up rules for
payment methods and collective bargaining. 22 1 The extent to which
these laws are actually enforced against Chinese companies, however,
remains somewhat unclear. As in South Africa, Nigeria's labor
movement and unions are politically well established and appear
genuinely "rights-conscious, sensitive to economic and social rights,
and focused on the biting poverty that afflicts the Nigerian
underclass." 222 Labor unions may be serving as an effective check
against abuses by Chinese firms.
For instance, to protest
"dehumanising treatment" by construction companies like China
Railway Construction Corporation, in mid-2014, the National Union
of Civil Engineering, Construction, Furniture and Wood Workers
gave the Nigerian federal government a fourteen-day "ultimatum" to
address its concerns, or else it "would not hesitate to shut down the
entire industry." 22 3 On the other hand, the union leader argued
these actions were only necessary because the government has failed
to properly monitor Chinese companies and enforce compliance with
224
Nigeria's laws in the first place.

220.
See Kunle Obebe & Dayo Adu, Nigeria, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR LAW 2011, at 178, 178 (2011)
(noting that, along with the Labour Act, employment law is governed by "received
English law" and Nigerian case law).
221.
See id. at 178-79 (breaking down how Nigerian law governs the terms and
conditions of employment, employee representation, industrial relations, and
discrimination).
222.
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, What Should Organized Human Rights Activism
in Africa Become? Contributory Insights from a Comparison of NGOs and Labor-Led
Movements in Nigeria, 16 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 113, 123-129 (2010).
223.
Linda Eroke, Nigeria: Labour Issues 14-Day Ultimatum to FG over
Exploitation by Chinese Companies, ALL AFRICA (Jul. 9, 2014), http://allafrica.com/
stories/201407091106.html [perma.cc/5NKK-GT86] (archived Jan. 27, 2016). The union
cited "casualisation, victimisation of workers, expatriate quota abuse, non-adherence to
safety standards and refusal of workers to organise" as the most serious unfair
practices by Chinese employers. Id. It is unclear whether or how these disagreements
were subsequently resolved.
224.
See id. (arguing that "factory inspectors under the labour ministry had
failed in their responsibilities to monitor project sites and ensure that contractors
comply with the health and safety standards.").
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C. Anti-CorruptionEfforts and Accountability
One important reason corruption persists in South Africa and
Nigeria is the inability of both countries to establish monitoring
bodies that are both effective and independent. 22 5 Some scholars
have argued that an even more fundamental cause, particularly in
Nigeria, is a pervasive lack of will to end corruption. After all "it is
difficult to expect political will from people who manipulated their
way into power" in the first place. 22 6 At present in both nations,
comprehensive domestic solutions to the problem of corruption seem a
22
long way off.

7

In Nigeria, following the creation of the 1999 Constitution, all
judicial appointments are screened by a National Judicial Council for
the "requisite competence and integrity." 228 While this process is
meant to curb corruption in the courts and promote their
independence, it is deeply flawed. More often than not, the main
criteria for appointments are seemingly the "personal prejudice and
ethnic and political considerations" of the Council. 229 These problems
have now "so infused the selection process that some people who are
2 30
demonstrably ill-qualified to serve as judges have been appointed."
The Council may also impose criminal and professional sanctions on
corrupt judges, as a post-appointment means of promoting
accountability. 23 1 These efforts have been aggressive and relatively
more successful-though perhaps because Council members use this
2 32
mechanism to harass their political opponents.
Outside of the judicial context, there is also an Independent
Corrupt Practices and Related Offenses Commission (ICPC),
established by the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act
(CPORO Act) of 2000.233 ICPC agents have "broad authority to
search, seize, investigate, inspect, and examine" evidence to root out

225.
See Udombana, supra note 157, at 479-80 (describing the weaknesses in
the South African Special Investigating Unit for corruption, as well as the Nigerian
anti-corruption laws).
226.
Ogbu, supra note 157, at 148.
227.
Cf. Demas, supra note 104, at 359-61 (predicting that true governance
reforms will be unsuccessful unless nations like China join the West in policing "their"
companies operating in Africa).
228.
Oko, supra note 168, at 49-50.
229.
Id.
Id.
230.
231.
See id. at 54-56 (noting that judges may incur both forms of sanctions
simultaneously, providing for a substantial deterrent).
232.
See id. at 60-64 (admitting that the prevalence of this problem is
unknown).
233.
See Obgu, supra note 157, at 116-17 ("[The Corrupt Practices and Other
Related Offenses Act of 2000 . . . recognized the power of the Independent Corrupt
Practices and Related Offenses Commission ("ICPC"), created by the Act, to prosecute
persons who violate existing laws on corruption.").
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corruption. 234 Nevertheless, the ICPC has had only limited success:
some scholars argue that it is not authorized to mete out sufficiently
harsh punishments, and that its enforcement efforts have been
inadequate. 23 5 The CPORO Act also lacks any provisions protecting
Early in its existence the ICPC was often
whistleblowers. 23 6
criticized as a creature of the president, 23 7 and a 2002 amendment to
the CPORO Act dramatically reduced its investigative powers even as
it made it more independent. 2 38 The Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) is similarly in charge of investigating and
prosecuting officials for various financial crimes. 23 9 Established in
2002, the EFCC immediately made several high-profile arrests and
asset seizures; however, "it is a well-known secret that the
President's approval is required before any top political office holder
' 24 0
can be investigated.
Beyond these domestic agencies, Nigeria also now complies with
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 2 4 1 under
Extractive
the
which Chinese firms operating within the country must follow

Some aspects of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act of
234.
2000 have been held unconstitutional. See id. at 125 (citing Nigerian Supreme Court
decisions striking down a portion of the law allowing for lengthy detentions, and
another that it found interfered with the powers of the judiciary).
See id. at 127-28 (relaying the criticisms of "renowned Professor of
235.
Criminal Law, Cyprian 0. Okonkwo").
See id. at 127 ("A whistleblower's law is a desideratum for any meaningful
236.
fight against corruption.").
See id. at 127-31 (recounting an incident where the ICPC failed to
237.
investigate clear allegations of corruption against a political ally of President
Obasanjo).
See id. at 130-31 (criticizing the amendment for divesting the Commission
238.
of prosecution authority and instead vesting it solely with the Attorney General).
See id. at 131 ("Financial crimes include any form of 'fraud, narcotic drug
239.
trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt
malpractices, illegal arms deal [sic], smuggling, human trafficking and child labour,
illegal oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices
including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open
market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and prohibited goods."').
Id. at 131-35.
240.
Eli G. Burton, Comment, Reverse the Curse: Creating a Framework to
241.
Mitigate the Resource Curse and Promote Human Rights in Mineral Extraction
Industries in Africa, 28 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 425, 441-42 (2014) ("[Tihe Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative ("EITI") [is] a global framework that promotes
revenue transparency at the local level of production .... [T]he self-implementation
aspect involves adopting the general EITI framework and adapting it to suit a state's
particular needs and circumstances (e.g., level of development). This customizable facet
gives EITI the flexibility to work at many different levels of both state development
and the extraction chain of production. Such flexibility enables each state to meet base
standards of transparency and expand upon them for maximum effectiveness, while
not constraining them to standards they may not be able to achieve due to a lack of
resources.").
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EITI is an international body that
reporting requirements. 2 42
"monitor[s] and reconcil[es] company payments and government
revenues at the level of individual countries; to be deemed 'EITI
compliant,' each country needs to implement EITI compliant
regulations and establish a multi-stakeholder group of civil society,
government, and private industry representatives to oversee
implementation." 2 43 EITI thus serves as a check on both corruption
and abusive labor practices. However, EITI compliance alone is not
enough to stem the tide of corruption in Nigeria: it can still fester in a
transparent government that is not being held accountable. 24 4 Some
scholars suggest the "culture of corruption" there has thrived because
the country's oil wealth has severed any "fiscal nexus of
accountability ...

that is entailed by public taxation."245 The status

quo may just be too profitable.
South Africa has major advantages over Nigeria in combating
corruption and promoting rule of law. First, it has a comparatively
robust civil society, including many non-governmental organizations
that can serve as an "important check" on corruption. 24 6 In addition,
the country "is home to vibrant journalists' and press freedom
advocacy organizations" that have widely publicized corruption
scandals despite defamation suits against them. 2 47 The primary
anti-corruption law is the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt
Activities Act (PACCA), which proscribes bribery and other forms of
public corruption. 24 8 The police and National Prosecuting Authority
249
enforce these laws, though their successes have also been limited.
Criminal penalties are attached to violations of PACCA, as well as

See Kelley, supra note 21, at 40 (approving of China's acquiescence to the
242.
principles behind EITI). "China could benefit from further support of EITI as it would
provide more political stability when challenging operational environments and would
allow Chinese companies to compete at an equal level with Western companies." Id.
Id. at 39.
243.
244.
See id. at 40, 40 n.141 (suggesting mass protests may be required to
actually hold entrenched politicians accountable if corruption is seen as so normal that
transparency alone does not actually discourage it).
245.
Rotimi T. Suberu, The Travails of Nigeria's Anti-Corruption Crusade, in
CORRUPTION, GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER 260, 260-61 (Robert I. Rotberg
ed., 2009).
246.
Mbaku, supra note 12, at 961.
247.
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2013: SOUTH AFRICA (2013),
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/south-africa [perma.cc/7X8A-5WL8]
(archived Jan. 27, 2016).
248.
See Pamela R. Davis, The FCPA Is No Longer the Only Game in Town:
Recent Anti-Corruption Enforcement Trends in the BRICS, 2014 WL 10500, at *7
(2014) (describing whistleblower protections and common law fraud as part of South
Africa's anticorruption framework, as well).
249.
See id. at *8 ("While the framework to address corruption is in place,
enforcement of anti-bribery regulations in South Africa remains inconsistent.
Regulatory agencies often struggle with investigating complex cases and rely heavily
on active assistance from whistleblowers.").
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the knowing failure to report corruption. 250 Finally, the government
has created many other specialized institutions to combat
corruption. 2 51 Chief among these is the Anti-Corruption Task Team
of the Special Investigating Unit, which has extensive powers to
investigate, take civil actions against wrongdoers, and coordinate
25 2
with police and prosecuting authorities in criminal matters.
Corruption (or at least the perception of corruption) in South
Africa has actually been increasing in recent years, however, which
2 53
suggests these measures have not been particularly effective.
Various forms of financial misconduct have cost South African
taxpayers increasing amounts over the years, from around 350
million rand in 2009/10 (about twenty-one million in today's dollars)
2 54
to almost 1 billion rand in 2011/12 (around 61 million dollars).
Despite the country's multifarious enforcement bodies, most of these
funds have never been recovered and the responsible parties are
apparently not often prosecuted. 25 5 This may be, in part, because
corruption may extend all the way to the National Prosecuting
2 56
Authority itself.

250.
See id. ("Compliance programs are not mandated by South African law.
However, regulators often consider the existence and scope of such programs in
bringing charges and crafting penalties.").
251.
More than a dozen separate agencies exist to monitor or combat corruption
in South Africa. See Newham, supra note 163 (asserting that South Africans rightly
perceive increasing problems with corruption, in spite of these agencies). In addition,
the country has signed onto a variety of treaties and adopted a slew of laws since the
1990s. See South Africa: Anti-Corruption Task Team Intact, ALL AFRICA (Jan. 27,
2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201501271357.html [perma.cc/JL9L-FEED] (archived
Jan. 27, 2016) (listing anti-corruption measures and discussing South Africa's goals for
reducing corruption, as articulated in its Medium Term Strategic Framework).
252.
See Who We Are, SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNIT, http://www.siu.org.za/whowe-are [perma.cc/UHT4-QJN2] (archived Jan. 27, 2016) (laying out the agency's
"primary mandate ... to recover and prevent financial losses to the state caused by
acts of corruption, fraud and maladministration.").
253.
See Elbra, supra note 184, at 555 (citing to Transparency International,
which gave South Africa steadily decreasing scores from 2007 to 2011, on a scale of ten
as the least corrupt to zero as the most corrupt). Elbra then goes on to describe a "low
level of successful prosecution" for corruption against politicians, as well as in the
defense and mining industries, blaming it on "incomplete evidence or the conclusion
that allegations were politically motivated." Id.
254.
See Lorraine Louw, The Real Cost of Corruption-PartTwo, CORRUPTION
WATCH (Jul. 9, 2013), http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-real-cost-of-corruptionpart-two/ [perma.ccI4RHR-DBJL] (archived Jan. 27, 2016) (citing a report by the law
firm Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs).
255.
See id. (asserting that in 2010 and 2011, officials investigated for financial
misconduct faced no prosecution in 76 percent of cases, in 43 percent of cases suffered
only a written warning, and that only 12.8 percent of lost funds were recovered in 2009
and 2010).
256.
See Jeremy Kutner, In South Africa, Corrupt Prosecutorsan Ever-Larger
Problem, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com
World/Africa/2014/0102/In-South-Africa-corrupt-prosecutors-an-ever-larger-problem
[perma.cc/22HN-B5DM] (archived Jan. 27, 2016) (claiming that the political appointees
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D. InternationalTreaties
Bilateral and multilateral treaties are an additional framework
by which China's interactions with Africa can be policed. For
instance, disputes over dumping are currently governed mainly by
"multilateral commitments" under the World Trade Organization,
25 7
though these commitments are beyond the scope of this Note.
258
Nigeria and China do not yet have a full free trade agreement.
China is, however, currently negotiating a free trade agreement with
the Southern African Customs Union. 2 59 On the other hand, a trend
toward increased liberalization of trade could worsen dumping
2 60
problems in Nigeria and South Africa.
BITs allow nations that desire to host foreign investment, but
otherwise might appear too risky for investors, to attract funds by
agreeing to certain constraints to safeguard the rule of law and
encourage investment. 26 1
BITs basically act as a commitment
mechanism for less-developed nations.2 62 Their use may provide
substantial economic opportunities for Sub-Saharan Africa, a region
that is badly in need of reliable sources of capital.2 63
One
at the head of the National Prosecuting Authority often irrationally refuse to prosecute
well-connected officials).
257.
Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects, supra note 6, at 579.
258.
See Egbula & Zheng, supra note 7, at 4 (noting a host of other agreements
between the countries).
259.
See generally Jonathan Munemo, Trade Between China and South Africa:
Prospects of a Successful SACU-China Free Trade Agreement, 25 AFR. DEV. REV. 303
(2013) (suggesting that such an agreement is necessary to further South Africa's trade
integration with China).
260.
See id. at 326 ("Achieving these opportunities will not be easy for China
due to growing opposition from industry and trade unions in SACU who fear that more
competition from China's manufactured goods will lead to serious job losses and
exacerbate the serious unemployment problem they currently face, especially in South
Africa.").
261.
See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 681
(1998) ("[Under a BIT framework,] the cost of investing is reduced, more investment
will take place, and the investment that does occur will be allocated in an efficient
manner. BITs, therefore, yield an efficient allocation of capital.").
262.
See id. at 658 (arguing that BITs solve the "dynamic inconsistency"
problem that "future policy decision that forms part of an optimal plan formulated at
an initial date is no longer optimal from the viewpoint of a later date, even though no
new information has appeared in the meantime"). Ultimately, they "represent a
'bargain,' whereby a host country promises to protect home-country FDI in exchange
for the prospect of increased foreign capital in the future." Johnson, supra note 137, at
924.
263.
See Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties:A
Critique, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L. 131, 139 (2013) [hereinafter Ofodile, Africa-China] ("The
benefits of FDI for a capital-importing nation include: access to new technologies and
opportunity for technology transfer; expanded tax base and related opportunity for
increased revenue; reduced dependence on foreign aid and external debt; access to new
sources of financing for development; and support for local business suppliers through
linkages.").
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particularly attractive argument to host nations is that BITs should
primarily be structured as "connective bridge[s] between the
commercial sphere and the human rights sphere," to draw investors
to mutually beneficial ventures while also holding them accountable
2 64
for exploiting or ignoring weak regulatory regimes in host nations.
BITs were originally created by Western nations to support their
former colonies while protecting their own investors. 265 Common
sense suggests, however, that BITs will tend to reflect the interests of
the more-powerful partner. Indeed, Western BITs are often long on
investor protections and short on investor obligations. 2 66
In
particular, BITs usually protect the following six key investor rights:
(1) right to fair, equitable and non-discriminatory treatment; (2) right to freely
transfer capital out of host-country; (3) protection from expropriation and
measures tantamount to expropriation[,] and right to prompt and adequate
compensation in the event of expropriation; (4) right to international
arbitration if and when disputes arise; (5) limitation on performance
2 67
requirements; and (6) right of investors to select top managerial personnel.

In the first few decades of Chinese-African relations, China's
BITs tended to avoid such strict protections of investor rights, instead
However,
allowing its partners "considerable policy space. '"268
Chinese BITs signed with African nations in the last twenty years
have become increasingly more like Western BITs and now contain
more pro-investor provisions. 26 9 The 2001 China-Nigeria BIT, for
instance, provides for "fair and equitable treatment" of investors and
investments, guarantees free repatriation of investments and
returns, and prohibits "unreasonable or discriminatory" measures as

264.
Sharon Hang, Comment, Investing in Human Rights: Using Bilateral
Investment Treaties to Hold Multinational Corporations Liable for Labor Rights
Violations, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1215, 1260 (2014).
265.
See id. at 138-39 ("BITs were specially designed by Western nations in the
wake of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s to protect their investors and the
investment of their investors in developing countries.").
266.
See Ofodile, Africa-China, supra note 263, at 138-39 (noting that such
protections were necessary due to a lack of comprehensive international investment
rules).
267.
Id. at 141.
268.
Id. at 155. For instance, early Chinese BITs contained no dispute
resolution provisions, thereby letting the host country resolve investment disputes on
its own terms. See id. at 155-56 (concluding this trend only began to change around
the late 1990s).
269.
See id. at 159-60 ("[T]he key features of China-Africa BITs are: a broad
asset-based definition of investments; absolute standards of treatment (for example,
fair and equitable treatment) clauses; relative standards of treatment (for example,
National Treatment and Most-Favored-Nations)
clauses; protection against
expropriation; protection against wars, riots, and related civil disturbances; State-State
dispute settlement as well as Investor-State dispute settlement procedures;
subrogation clauses; and clauses guaranteeing the right of investors to freely transfer
funds.").
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well as expropriation, unless it is performed "(a) for the public
interests; (b) under domestic legal procedure; (c) without
discrimination; [and] (d) against fair compensation." 270
It also
requires arbitration of all disputes between Nigeria and China that
cannot be resolved within a year. 2 7 1 Disputes between either China
or Nigeria and an investor will be arbitrated if they cannot be
resolved within six months. 272 While the BIT does stipulate that
"[e]ach Contracting Party shall promote economic cooperation and
encourage investors of the other Contracting Party to make
investments in its territory and admit such investments in
accordance with its laws and regulations," and recognizes investors
have a "duty to respect the host country's sovereignty and laws," it
2 73
does not provide enforcement mechanisms other than arbitration.
The terms of the 1997 China-South Africa BIT are substantially
similar. 2 74
Both BITs were signed after China acceded to the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
275
(ICSID), and "provide for open access to ICSID arbitration."
China's agreements with African nations, including BITs, are
problematic because they put no real pressure on these nations to
institute internal reforms. 2 76 They do not address issues like human

270.
Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and
the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, China-Nigeria, Aug. 27, 2001 [hereinafter China-Nigeria
BIT], http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/h/aw/201002/20100206795412.shtml
[perma.cc/
K4MQ-XLB8] (archived Jan. 27, 2016).
271.
See id. (allowing each party to appoint one arbitrator, with the two
arbitrators then appointing a third party national to chair the tribunal). Otherwise,
"[t]he arbitral tribunal shall determine its procedure." Id.
272.
See id. (requiring the tribunal to adjudicate in accordance with the laws of
the contracting nation involved).
273.
Id.
274.
See Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Government of the Republic of South Africa Concerning the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-S. Mr., Dec. 30, 1997,
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/h/aw/201002/20100206778967.shtml
[https://perma.cc/
B8RX-6CA3] (archived Feb. 27, 2016).

275.

Won Kidane, The China-Africa Factor in the Contemporary ICSID

Legitimacy Debate, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 559, 563-64 (2014) [hereinafter Kidane, The
China-Africa Factor]. The World Bank-affiliated ICSID was established in 1966 to
serve as a truly neutral option for investment dispute resolution; See Charles N.

Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What's in a Meme? The Truth About Investor-State
Arbitration:Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 697 (2014) (arguing that ICSID arbitration has "fulfilled its
promise of increasing foreign direct investment where it has been most acutely needed
and curbing gunboat diplomacy."); see also INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES
[ICSID],
ABOUT ICSID,
https:/Hicsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/
about/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/U2FX-CLZC] (archived Feb. 27, 2016)
(explaining what ICSID does and its history).
276.
See Yu, supra note 76, at 1003 (arguing that this approach has been very
popular with developing nations because "many of the reforms advocated by the
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rights, environmental protections, or labor issues in host countries,
and do not include provisions to encourage corporate social
responsibility. 2 7 7 This practice is an extension of China's historical
policy of non-intervention. 2 78 "Chinese leaders have stated explicitly
and frequently that China is not interested in achieving 'regional
hegemony or international leadership (except perhaps in the context
of promoting the interests of the developing world)." 2 79 In this way,
China is very different from most Western states that, when acting as
donors and lenders to developing countries, usually "require the
recipient countries to introduce political and economic reforms, such
as 'restrictions on macroeconomic policy, reductions in public
spending and commitments to transparency as well as, in some cases,
the holding of democratic elections."' 280 Thus, current ChineseAfrican BITs, including those with Nigeria and South Africa, do not
address any negative externalities that investment might impose on
host countries, and in fact may further promote instability and allow
28 1
for exploitative measures by Chinese firms.

V. CHINA: THE PROBLEM OR THE SOLUTION?

This Part first summarizes the downsides to Chinese
involvement discussed in Part III, and determines that on balance the
evidence in support the "neo-colonialism" narrative is not particularly
strong with regard to South Africa and Nigeria. Nonetheless, some
downsides do exist for these countries. This Part proposes that they
should approach these problems from a new direction, because their
prior attempts to remedy them purely through domestic law, as seen
in Part IV, have not been very successful. It addresses but then
traditional donors or lenders have not greatly alleviated poverty in the less-developed
world").
277.
See Kidane & Zhu, supra note 156, at 1066-80 (suggesting that Chinese
BITs are in serious need of updating); Ofodile, Africa-China, supranote 263, at 191-92
(arguing that modern Chinese BITs scarcely address host country development rights
or investors' obligations). By contrast, the U.S. Model BIT includes provisions
addressing environmental and labor standards in the host country. See Hang, supra
note 263, at 1246-47 (adding that the United States appears to be more concerned
about host nations 'lowering their labor standards in order to draw in more
investments" than acting out of humanitarian concerns). However, often investors are
merely admonished to respect local labor rights, with the treaty imposing no additional
penalties on violators. See id. at 1258-59 (describing this as "preambular language").
278.
See Hang, supra note 264, at 1258-59. ("As a Chinese diplomat chortled:
'Non-intervention is our brand, like intervention is the Americans' brand."').
279.
Yu, supra note 76, at 994-95.
280.
Id. Chinese aid and concessional loans also lack political reform conditions.
See Hubbard, supra note 96, at 217-18 (noting this practice may enhance China's soft
power).
281.
See Ofodile, Africa-China, supra note 263, at 197-98 (concluding that, as a
result of such costs, African nations should not seek to renew BITs with China until
they can find a better negotiating position).

542

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:499

rejects the solution of "re-statification"-namely, that BITs are part of
the problem and that greater power over foreign investors should be
given the host nations. Instead, this Note recommends that reform of
China's BITs with South African and Nigeria is a better and more
feasible path to repairing any negative externalities of Chinese
investment and trade.
Based on the issues explored in Part III, the amount of harm
that Chinese activities have caused Nigeria or South Africa appears
uncertain at best. Nigeria is suffering significant environmental
degradation because of the activities of multinational oil companiesyet China is, at most, one of many potential culprits. 282 China may
also be engaged in abusive labor practices in both South Africa and
Nigeria but, with the exception of the treatment of migrant laborers,
most evidence is anecdotal. 2 83 Cheap Chinese goods have hurt the
countries' domestic industries, but, considering the countervailing
employment opportunities provided by investment, to a smaller
degree than might be expected. 28 4 Finally, there is certainly evidence
to suggest China supports corrupt practices in these countries, 285 but
accurately tracking that phenomenon or accounting for specific
instances is much more difficult. Thus, criticisms of China-at least
with respect to Nigeria or South Africa-are based more on anecdotes
or inferences than hard data.
Given this lack of concreteness, any anxieties about China's
28 6
Of
influence in these countries should probably be discounted.
fact
that
real
people
have
been
course, this does not negate the
harmed as a result of Chinese involvement. 2 87 However, the benefits
of Chinese involvement are much easier to trace, which suggests that
the "neo-colonial" narrative likely does not accurately describe
China's overall relationships with these countries. This conclusion
does not necessarily extend to other countries like Zambia and Sudan,
where the connections between China and human rights abuses
appear to be more tangible. 288 This discussion has also uncovered
significant failures in both South Africa and Nigeria to remedy the

282.
See supra Part IV.A.1; supra Part V.A.
283.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
284.
See supra Part IV.B.
285.
See supra Part IV.C.
286.
Presumably, those costs that may not even exist or that may in fact be
exaggerated should be given less weight in a cost-benefit analysis. Cf. White House
Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Oct. 29, 1992) (providing guidelines for how
U.S. federal agencies should treat uncertainty when engaging in expected value
determinations and cost-benefit analysis).
287.
Consider the all too concrete case of Chinese migrant laborers. See
generally Rodgers, supra note 124.
288.
See, e.g., Kotecki, supranote 101, at 232; ChinaMines, supra note 135.
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2 89
general problems that might be attributable to China.
Conceivably, these failures could one day prove an obstacle to China's
2 90
continued relationships with South Africa and Nigeria.

A. The Potentialfor BITs to Mitigate Government Failures
If any common thread connects the legal and regulatory
shortcomings in these countries, it is a worrying lack of respect for
the rule of law. 29 1 Both countries' governments have at times shown
a marked unwillingness or at least inability to enforce their laws, and
this impedes their abilities to curb any potential downsides of
Chinese involvement. 292 African nations frequently lack the strong
rule of law that might be found in a Western country. 2 93 This is true
294
in South Africa and especially Nigeria.
BITs are sometimes seen as contributing to these problems,
though this Note argues these criticisms are unfair. First, their
terms are sometimes criticized for being too "boilerplate," and not
varying sufficiently across different countries. 295 This is probably a
legitimate concern regarding the current BITs between China and
South Africa and Nigeria, as they are quite similar. Second, investorstate arbitration in general might be inequitable as a disputeresolution mechanism. 296 Some nations and scholars have argued

289.
See supra Part V.
290.
Cf. Chen Huiping, Recent Approaches in China's BITs and Impact on
African Countries, 107 AM. SOC'v INT'L L. 228, 229-30 ("Chinese investors in Africa
have suffered great losses arising from the geopolitical risks of investing in Africa, such
as the revolutions in Libya and Egypt.").
291.
See supra Part JV.C; supra Part V.
292.
Proper rule of law could serve as a significant barrier to the negative
externalities described above, by facilitating more effective regulation of harmful
activities. Especially important are the concepts that no one should be above the law
and that individuals' rights should be protected by the courts. Cf. Mbaku, supra note
12, at 983-84 (discussing various definitions of the rule of law).
See id. (describing the role of colonialism and its legacy of institutional
293.
failure in Africa).
NIGERIA,
http://
294.
Compare CORRUPTION BY COUNTRY/TERRITORY:
[https:/perma.ccfWEF7-EHXC]
www.transparency.org/country#NGADataResearch
(archived Feb. 27, 2016) (giving Nigeria a score of 11 percent in the Rule of Law
category as of 2010), with CORRUPTION BY COUNTRYITERRITORY: SOUTH AFRICA,
[https://perma.cc/B7B3-VZV4]
(archived
http://www.transparency.org/country#ZAF
Feb. 27, 2016) (giving South Africa a score of 61 percent in the Rule of Law category as
of 2010).
295.
See Johnson, supra note 137, at 928-29 ("But Africa is a large and diverse
continent, and liberalizing BIT provisions that attract FDI in one African country may
be inappropriate or unworkable in another."); Ofodile, Africa-China, supra note 263, at
206 ("China-Africa BITs do not take into account the fact that most countries in Africa
are at their early stages of development and that African LDCs are least likely to
benefit from such agreements.").
296.
See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 275, at 709 ("There are two variants
of the argument that investor-State arbitration is one-sided: one contends that
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that arbitration, particularly when under the auspices of ICSID,
favors multinational corporate investors to the detriment of host
nations. 29 7 Third, this arbitration is also somewhat "opaque,"
allowing investors and hosts to avoid reputational fallout from bad
behavior in disputes. 29 8 Finally, one particularly crucial dispute is
whether BITs "limit state discretion" to the extent they cannot
29 9
protect their own interests or the interests of their citizens.
Some scholars have thus proposed that host nations should exert
greater domestic control over investor-state disputes, on the
assumption that international arbitration does not sufficiently
These jurists recommend "reconstrain investor abuses. 30 0
statification" to protect the interests of host nations-scrapping all or
part of BITs and replacing them with host nation regulation or
adjudication. 30 1 South Africa's pending Promotion and Protection of
Investment Bill (PPI Bill), exemplifies this "re-statification"
argument. 30 2 It would terminate many of South Africa's BITs

arbitrators are biased and the other that treaty protections and investor-State
arbitration structurally favor investors.").
297.
See, e.g., Brower & Blanchard, supra note 275, at 709-10; Hang, supra
note 264, at 1255-59 ('The use of private arbitration (in BITs] is ... problematic
because, since cases are decided on an ad hoc basis, this leads to uncertainty over what
an MNC's obligations are in relation to a host state. The arbitrators used in these
arbitrations have also been criticized for being primarily investment-oriented and
inexperienced in the human rights area. This bias in favor of investors is made worse
by the fact that some arbitrators have acted or later will act as legal counsel for the
investors involved in the dispute."). A related position is that, even if BIT
arrangements are efficiency-producing, they reduce the overall welfare of developing
nations by over encouraging competition for investment between them. Guzman, supra
note 261, at 680-84 ("In the absence of BITs, international law currently yields the
same economic result as would an agreement among developing countries to never
negotiate with potential investors before the investment. Such collusion would force
investors to either invest without knowing the final terms under which they have to
operate or refrain from investing. The practical effect is to increase the 'price' at which
the resources of developing countries are sold.").
See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 275, at 717-20.
298.
299.
See id. at 721-27; Ofodile, Africa-China, supra note 263, at 206 ("[I]n many
respects [Chinese BITs] limit the capacity of governments in Africa to use policy
instruments that China used in the past to regulate FDI in order to build up national
industry.").
300.
See Ofodile, Africa-China,supra note 263, at 136 ("[A]cross the globe there
is a growing revolt against standard BITs, with their exclusive emphasis on investor
protection but not investor obligations.").
See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 275, at 696, 697-99 ("What all of
301.
these proposals by states, academics, and NGOs have in common is the urge to return
investment dispute settlement to the control of states and thereby dispense with the
present rule-based system of independent and impartial, hence apolitical, investment
dispute resolution.").
See Reed, supra note 9, at 295 (calling the PPI Bill "a radical approach" to
302.
tensions between domestic policies and foreign investment). As of September 16, 2015,
the PPI Bill is still in committee. See Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, South Africa's Promotion
and Protection of Investment Bill (PPIB), Presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio
Committee on Trade and Industry (Sept. 16. 2015), https://www.thedti.gov.za/
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(though not with China), and impose other domestic regulations on
them.3 0 3
The PPI bill would also narrow the definition of
expropriation by permitting actions that have merely "incidental or
indirect" effects or are "aimed at protecting or enhancing legitimate
public welfare objectives, such as public health or safety,
30 4
environmental protection or state security."
Yet, proposals to protect individual rights and enforce investors'
obligations simply through domestic law like this are probably
misguided. Even if the PPI bill were to be passed, South Africa's
capacity to "re-statify" is much greater than that of Nigeria or most of
China's other African trading partners. South Africa is unusual on
the continent because its judiciary's independence is relatively intact
and properly respected. 305 There, a repudiation of BITs might truly
allow the government additional freedom to reign in abuises by
foreign investors. On the other hand, South Africa's own problems
with corruption could twist the PPI and make matters worse. 306
In either case, such results probably could not be replicated in
nations without strong judiciaries. In Nigeria for instance, frequently
"the outcome of a case depends not on the merits and strength of the
case but on the whims and caprices of the presiding judge."30 7 In
such an atmosphere, as in other countries in Africa with similar
problems, even an imperfectly-neutral international arbitral process
would enforce the law better. 30 8 In the realm of environmental
parliament/2015/dtiResponsePPIB.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY77-9S8E] (archived Feb.
27, 2016).
303.
See Reed, supra note 9, at 295, 298 (noting the South African government
cancelled BITs with Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, Germany, and
Switzerland following a mineral rights expropriation suit with the International
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and plans to follow do the same
with the rest of its European BITs). Stated briefly, the PPI Bill "provides fewer
protections for foreign investors by containing an ambiguous definition of 'investment,'
lack[s] an FET [Fair and Equitable Treatment of Investors] provision, narrow[s] the
definition of expropriation, and exclude[s] disputes from international arbitration." Id.
at 299.
304.
Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill of 2013 (proposed) (S. Mr.),
http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/1llPromotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill.2013Invitation-for-public-comment.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7MB.MCLW] (archived Feb. 27,
2016).
305.
See Mbaku, supra note 12, at 1007 (discussing several opinions of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa regarding the extent of judicial independence in
the country). This may be a result, at least partially, of South Africa's common law
heritage. See id. at 1022-23 ("In countries in which the common law is the foundation
for the legal system, 'courts contribute to the rule of law through their authority to
make common law rules and to interpret legislation and constitutions; those actions
shape the legal environment in which citizens order their economic and personal
affairs."').
306.
See, e.g., Elbra, supra note 184, at 555 (citing to Transparency
International, which gave South Africa steadily decreasing scores from 2007 to 2011).
307.
Oko, supra note 168, at 28-29.
308.
Cf.Brower & Blanchard, supra note 275, at 716, 716 n.103 (referencing
disputes in Kenya, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela where "tribunals have rejected
investors' contract and treaty claims on the grounds that the investments were secured
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protections, for instance, investment arbitration is generally not "propolluter" but often "reveals great respect for environmental protection
efforts and national policy discretion." 30 9 If this is the case generally,
the "re-statification" of investment disputes may actually be harmful
for nations like Nigeria. 3 10 The absence of credible commitment
mechanisms like those required by BITs might allow African nations
3 11
to extract greater rents from foreign investors in the short run.
However, over the long run this behavior will likely drive foreign
3 12
investors away.
This Note proposes that external pressures on Nigeria and South
Africa imposed through their BITs with China will be more successful
in mitigating any problems China might cause them. 3 13 Some
scholars have pushed back against the so-called "meme" that BITs
314
are harmful or ineffective, or that arbitration is inherently biased.
In fact, well-crafted BITs can promote the rule of law in developing
countries through international arbitration and various other
conditions. 315 In nations like South Africa and Nigeria, 'internal'
political methods for resolving disputes, whether through recourse to
dependent judicial systems or attempts to settle with domestic
political actors, open doors for the entrenched corruption that exists
in many states with weak rule of law." 3 16 Furthermore, the investor
by corruption in violation of domestic law and international public policy or that the
investor violated its contractual obligations to the host state").
309.
Id. at 725-26.
310.
Id. at 697.
311.
See Guzman, supra note 261, at 677 ("The host [nation] is able to extract
rents because once the investment is made, the host is in the position of a monopolist.
It can choose to set the 'price' for its resources at the level that maximizes its own
return.").
312.
See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 275, at 704 (asserting that "investors
remain deeply concerned about political risk and expropriation abroad and actively
seek ways to reduce their exposure").
313.
See Demas, supra note 104, at 359-61 (suggesting actions by China may be
key to improving the rule of law in Africa).
314.
See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 275, at 699 ("[O]bjections that began
as ideologically driven polemics have come to be widely, but inaccurately, presumed as
truths"). Recent statistical evidence and case studies have failed to find any
"systematic and glaring bias against or purposeful disadvantage to the positions of
African states" within the ICSID, suggesting instead that outcomes are "surprisingly
balanced." Kidane, The China-Africa Factor, supra note 275, at 623.
315.
See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 275, at 778 (contrasting arbitration,
which "motivate[s] developing host countries to improve domestic administrative
practices and laws in order to avoid future disputes," with domestic dispute resolution,
which "open[s] doors for the entrenched corruption that exists in many states with
weak rule of law"). In this interpretation, "[r]ather than facing a tradeoff between
'corporate profit' and 'human rights and the environment,' States must balance various
objectives that serve the public interest, including the maintenance of a stable legal
environment necessary for healthy economic functioning and other political and
regulatory objectives." Id. at 755. "Beyond discouraging foreign investment, an
unstable political and legal environment hampers domestic development and the
ability of citizens to plan their futures." Id.
316.
Id. at 756-57.
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rights protected by BITs can be made to "overlap substantially with
the rights protected in human rights treaties," complementing
international humanitarian law. 3 17 BITs are binding once signed
and can promote reforms relatively quickly, since they are less likely
to be bogged down in domestic political processes. 3 18 Reforms carried
out through BITs also make the host nation more attractive to other
investors over the long term. 3 19 It stands to reason that BITs with
China-after all the continent's "largest infrastructure financier"can be particularly influential in this regard. 320 In China itself, for
instance, the evidence suggests developed countries' BITs do promote
the rule of law.

32 1

What is needed in Nigeria, and potentially South Africa, is a BIT
framework with China that provides greater structure and
specifically promotes the rule of law. Such a framework would put
these countries in
a better position to handle any negative
externalities caused by Chinese involvement. The new BITs should
put pressure on both countries to reform, as Western BITs do. Even

The Model
language in the preambles may be beneficial. 32 2
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development
is somewhat instructive. 32 3 It stipulates that host nations cannot
"waive or otherwise derogate from" labor, health, and safety
standards to encourage investment, and "shall ensure that its laws
and regulations provide for high levels" of labor and environmental

protections. 32 4 These requirements are vague, however, and probably
do not go far enough.

Imposing penalties on host nations unable to

Id. at 758.
317.
318.
See Johnson, supra note 137, at 928 ("Many African countries are in urgent
need of economic growth to combat extreme poverty but have no alternative other than
relying on external financing to fuel this development. And while certain African
countries have encouraged FDI by improving their general business climates, this
usually requires a long-term commitment to reform.").
319.
See id. ("A BIT's signaling and stabilizing effects enhance the credibility of
a country's reforms and indicate a meaningful commitment to protecting FDI.").
Kidane, The China-AfricaFactor, supra note 275, at 563.
320.
See Kate Hadley, Note, Do China's BITs Matter? Assessing the Effect of
321.
China's Investment Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Flows, Investors' Rights,
and the Rule of Law, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 255, 309-11 (2013) ("BIT programs of
developed democracies have been successful in promoting stronger property rights
foreign investors [sic] and some reforms that promote consistency and transparency in
China's legal system.").
322.
See Ofodile, Africa.China, supra note 263, at 193 ("Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, preambles do not create legally binding rights.
However, they constitute part of the context of an agreement and can become
important in the event a particular treaty is interpreted.").
See Kidane & Zhu, supra note 156, at 1074 ("The IISD Model has many
323.
features that make it more suitable for China-Africa relations.").
324.
INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. [IISD], IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2005), https://
[https:H/perma.cc/SP7Ywww.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment.model-int-agreement.pdf
B23B] (archived Feb. 27, 2016).
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meet those standards would probably be a draconian overcorrection.

However, provisions that limit aid or loans until certain conditions
are met, such as for proper adjudication of ongoing labor disputes or
corruption charges, could incentivize a cascade of political pressures
to mitigate such problems. At the same time, new BITs should put
additional obligations on Chinese investors, such as by requiring
them to monitor funds to ensure they are not simply pocketed by
corrupt officials, or to adhere to higher corporate governance or social
responsibility standards. 3 25 A particularly bold renegotiated BIT
might emulate the PPI in part by narrowing the definition of
expropriation. In this way, renegotiated BITs would promote the rule
of law while not doing away with necessary investor protections.
B. Feasibility: What About China'sInterests?
Renegotiating China's BITs with South Africa and Nigeria is
feasible so long as doing so is in the interests of the parties, especially
China. The PRC's position as a major investor and trading partner to
South Africa and Nigeria gives it substantial leverage. 32 6 China is so
attractive in part because its aid and investment is largely
unconditional. 3 27 If it begins to push for internal reforms, these
countries' governments will likely be hard-pressed to find more
lenient investors of similar means. 32 8 China has already begun to
prefer the Western BIT model. 32 9 If that trend continues, China
might be able to improve the rule of law in its trading partners
considerably.

325.
Cf. id. (laying out investor obligations to host countries: in order to avoid
complicity with corruption and subjection to liability, monitor investments for
compliance with domestic and international law, adopt more transparent practices, and
adhere to international corporate social responsibility standards).
See Haroz, supra note 83, at 79 ("While China has helped to spur African
326.
economic growth, many African countries lack a strategic focus in their engagement
with China-or a long-term vision that could ensure the partnership supports broader
poverty alleviation on the continent .... [E]ven among resource-rich African nations
[such as Nigeria], which have greater leverage in their dealings with the Chinese, 'this
advantage is [often] not converted into negotiating power."').
327.
See Keenan, supra note 5, at 94-97 (arguing that Chinese investment is
often preferred over other sources of funds because of their non-interference policies).
328.
Cf. id. ("Not surprisingly, as [western conditions became more intrusive,
recipient states became eager to identify other sources of financial support.").
See Ofodile, Africa-China, supra note 263, at 156 ("[Post-1998] BITs
329.
involving China exhibit characteristics, which together suggest a more liberal, proinvestor approach to BITs, including more comprehensive substantive provisions,
automatic and compulsory dispute settlement by international arbitration, broader
national treatment clauses, and considerably fewer restrictions on the transfer of
funds.").
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This Note suggests that China should accept its mantle as a
major economic power and pull further back from its noninterventionist policies, if only out of self-interest. One of China's
core foreign policy interests is its "continued economic development
and stable social order." 330 Resource scarcity threatens this. Even if
Chinese firms profit from the status quo in the short term, in the long
term it would let opportunities go to waste. 33 1 Promoting increased
respect for the rule of law in China's African trading partners would
benefit China by securing its access to key resources over the long
term, especially in the case of Nigeria. Regardless of whether China
is currently hampering the rule of law, working to improve it would
help stabilize the South African and Nigerian governments,
improving the safety of Chinese nationals and the security of
investments. 33 2 Less corrupt host countries are also less likely to
extort Chinese firms and more able to pay back loans. 3 33 The
purpose of BITs is to "reduce risk for investors by stabilizing the legal
framework within which the investment will operate," 334 but China's
agreements are not doing enough currently. This new policy direction
is also arguably in line with Chinese rhetoric of taking a leadership
role in the context of "promoting the interests of the developing
world."'3 35 It would also complement China's increased diplomatic
3 36
assertiveness.

330.
Cai, supra note 38, at 813, 818-19.
331.
See, e.g., Demas, supra note 104, at 328 (describing the millions of barrels
of oil lost in Nigerian oil spills).
332.
Chinese oil workers run the risk of being kidnapped by militants in
Nigeria. See Rodgers, supra note 124, at 1091-92 (describing multiple kidnappings of
Chinese nationals in Nigeria over the last several years); see also Tansa Musa,
Suspected Boko Haram Attack Chinese Workers in Cameroon; 10 Missing, REUTERS
(May 17, 2014, 11:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/18/us-nigeria[https:l/perma.cc/7MMH-LPK3]
violence-cameroon-idUSBREA4HOOK20140518
(archived Feb. 8, 2016) (reporting the abduction of ten Chinese construction workers by
Boko Haram from a site in neighboring Cameroon).
333.
See, e.g., Keenan, supra note 99, at 118 (arguing that when China provides
funding for projects directed by politicians in Africa, often the investments are not
profitable).
334.
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic
Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
501, 525 (1998).
Yu, supra note 76, at 994-95.
335.
336.
See Cai, supranote 38, at 815 (discussing Chinese foreign policy under Hu
Jintao, which emphasized a "readiness to undertake a stronger role in international
governance," and recognized that "fulfilling their domestic needs of economic growth
demands a more activist global strategy").
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The weaker bargaining positions of South Africa and Nigeria visi-vis China may make it more difficult for them to get what they
want in renegotiated BITs. Given the importance of the resources
they provide to China, however, they may not be totally at China's
mercy. 337 One obvious criticism of these proposed BIT renovations is
that they make it harder to convince investors that it is safe to invest
their money in an otherwise-volatile country. 3 38 However, China,
South Africa, and Nigeria maintain friendly relations 3 39 and the
proposed modifications to China-Africa BITs could make up for
regulatory concessions to the host nations with conditions, described
above, to reduce the chance of arbitrary or unfair enforcement.
Ultimately, neither side can force this renegotiation unilaterally; the
eventual terms must be a product of South Africa's and Nigeria's
overall alignment of interests with China. This Note has established,
however, that these countries largely benefit from Chinese trade and
investment. It is therefore likely they will be able to reach mutually
beneficial arrangements.

VI. CONCLUSION

In the twenty-first century, China is a critical trading partner of
and investor in African nations like Nigeria and South Africa.
However, there are conflicting narratives about whether China is
actually helping these countries or engaging in a new form of
colonialism. In Nigeria and South Africa at least, the benefits of
Chinese involvement are clear-clean energy, jobs, infrastructure,
and the like-whereas it is unclear whether and to what extent China
is actually violating human rights, damaging the local economy, or
promoting corruption in these countries.
To whatever extent China is actually causing any problems,
however, it appears these countries' domestic legal responses have
been inadequate and reflect a host of governmental failures. One
method by which Nigeria and South Africa could improve their ability
to reign in Chinese activities, and by which China could secure access
to resources for the foreseeable future, would be for the parties to
renegotiate their bilateral investment treaties to better promote rule
of law in the host nations. This method of promoting the rule of law

337.
See Ma, supra note 47 ("More than 80 percent of China's $93.2 billion in
imports from Africa in 2011 were crude oil, raw materials and resources.").
338.
Cf. Brower & Blanchard, supra note 275, at 704 ("In 2011, at least 38% of
respondents to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency's annual political risk
survey had withdrawn existing investments or cancelled planned investments because
of political risk in the previous twelve months.").
339.
See, e.g., Zuma Address, supra note 69 ("The discussions reaffirmed the
warm and wonderful relations between South Africa and China, which date back many
years ago during the struggle for liberation in our country.").
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in host countries would be more likely to succeed because it is not
only mutually beneficial to the countries involved, but is also less
vulnerable to the corruption to which reforms might fall prey if
carried out purely within domestic political processes.
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